

August 11, 1965

tablished political institutions. They look with disdain and contempt on the American people and are icily indifferent to their hopes and aspirations.

These far-out groups are to be more pitied than censured. For I can think of nothing more pitiful than Americans who have lost confidence in America because of their own frustrations and frailties.

Now, Mr. Speaker, the United Republicans of America says it does not like my voting record. It says that I am a rubberstamp and a robot of the Johnson administration.

I infer, then, that the United Republicans of America disagrees with my strong support of the war against communism, and my votes to strengthen our military forces in Vietnam.

I infer that the United Republicans of America disagrees with my efforts and votes for the war on poverty, under which more than 2,000 children of poverty in my district are now receiving special training, medical services and wholesome meals. Many of them are getting these benefits, which most of us take for granted, for the first time in their young lives.

I infer that the United Republicans of America disagrees with my efforts and votes to provide guaranteed medical-hospital care for the aged, and my successful efforts to help provide cost-of-living increases in social security pensions.

I infer that the United Republicans of America disagrees with my efforts and votes to strengthen and expand our system of public education in Ohio and the Nation. Under the Elementary and Secondary School Act of 1965 alone, my district is receiving more than \$1 million at the outset to build up its schools.

I infer that the United Republicans of America disagrees with my efforts and vote to reduce or eliminate burdensome Federal excise taxes that were taking billions of dollars a year out of the pockets of our people.

I infer that the United Republicans of America disagrees with my efforts and votes for our farmers and their families—for community development—for water and soil conservation—for rural housing—for flood control and watershed projects.

These are the programs that I support enthusiastically and wholeheartedly. If this makes me a "robot" then I say that what this country needs is more robots; if this makes me a captive of the Johnson administration, then I say that I am in good and responsible company.

I am unmoved and unconcerned about the threat of the URA to purge me. An examination of its statement of "principles," to use the word loosely, compels me to suggest that its author "multiplieth words without knowledge." In any event, nothing can come of nothing, and that is exactly what the URA represents: nothing. But it will be interesting to see whether the regular Republican organizations in Ohio and the 10th District repudiate the URA and all the nonsense that it stands for.

Mr. SCHMIDHAUSER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WELTNER. I yield to the gentleman from Iowa.

Mr. SCHMIDHAUSER. I would just like to compliment my colleague from Ohio. I, too, received one of those letters, and I would like to associate myself with his fine remarks.

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WELTNER. I yield to the gentleman from Alabama.

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I am not a member of the URA, but I did notice that the gentleman from Ohio referred to one of my colleagues as an arch segregationist who was one of the carpetbaggers in effect coming into Ohio. I wonder if the gentleman from Ohio informed my colleague that he was going to be attacked on the floor today and referred to in such a manner.

Mr. MOELLER. Mr. Speaker, I made no attack. Neither did I inform the gentleman.

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield for one moment further?

Mr. WELTNER. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama. I always have to smile when someone from Ohio or anywhere else refer to carpetbaggers coming into their States. I think it is well known the situation we have had in the South in the last few months as far as carpetbaggers are concerned. I am sure that the gentleman from Alabama who has been referred to as an arch segregationist will no doubt want to have his comments on the floor concerning these remarks.

See [initials] Edward
MORALITY AND VIETNAM

The SPEAKER. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. EDWARDS] is recognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama. Mr. Speaker, most of us have participated yesterday and today in discussions at the White House regarding the U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

I was especially interested to participate so as to assess statements made in this House last week relating to the morality of our U.S. effort to resist Communist aggression in Asia.

On 2 days last week Members of this body sought to show that our effort in Vietnam is immoral, that we do not belong there, and that we ought to take action amounting to withdrawal under conditions approximately equal to surrender.

Amazingly enough, they seek to show that the famous Dean Acheson speech of January 1950 justifies their current position in Vietnam. In that speech, widely recognized as an invitation to the Communists to attack South Korea, Mr. Acheson announced that the United States would not try to defend South Korea against attack. The attack came 6 months later.

The question of morality in our Vietnam policy is vital, and can easily be misunderstood, and I suspect misunder-

standing on the question extends well beyond the very few Members of this body who spoke about it last week.

Mr. Speaker, over the past several months while our national foreign policies, particularly with regard to southeast Asia, have become increasingly complicated and crucial, there has developed at the same time a chorus of criticism.

The kind of criticism I have in mind is that based on feelings that the United States is basically at fault in the Vietnam problem, that we resist a peaceful settlement of the conflict there, and generally that if we would prove ourselves to be peaceloving then the Communist governments would respond in kind and we would have a world of tranquillity.

These themes, and others related to them, are appearing in increasing volume and frequency in the public communications media. The people voicing them consider their position to be one of "moral indignation." Recently a fairly new publication made a big thing of comparing Ho Chi Minh with George Washington. The idea was that Ho Chi Minh is so popular throughout Vietnam that he reminds the editors of a kind of father of a democratic and idealistic government.

The motivations of most of these people are not in question. As a Nation we have always sought righteousness and the ideal, both at home and abroad. The American dream of self-government and individual liberty is based on expecting the best from others.

As Americans we are all appalled at the human tragedy unfolding in Vietnam today, and are disturbed to find ourselves involved. It is a jolt to our feelings of right and wrong, and we strain to find answers.

But, however much our sense of righteousness is touched, it is vital that in our search for answers we do not let wishful thinking be a substitute for a sense of history, logic, and realism. Wishful thinking as a substitute for realism in our approach to the Vietnam situation would not only be unfortunate but would be dangerous. Too much of it in the past is one reason why we have a Vietnam problem today.

Wishful thinking in our Vietnam situation is still widespread. It extends throughout the country. Some members of this House, for example, are evidently beginning now to voice their concern over the stated policy of firm defense against Communist aggression in Vietnam.

On August 3 some Members joined in a discussion on the floor of this House which sought to show how we should be acting differently to solve the Vietnam puzzle. To support their case they used events from the past, but have drawn conclusions which, I believe, show wishful thinking in a dangerous degree.

They appear to be suggesting that the United Nations should call a cease-fire in Vietnam and that the UN should organize elections in South Vietnam. Presumably the end result of this plan would be withdrawal of the United States from

August 11, 1965

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

Industrial and job piracy is a severe economic problem which is disrupting the economic balance of our Nation. Every Member of this body is affected by the situation in one way or another.

COMBAT PAY FOR FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS

(Mr. ASHBROOK (at the request of Mr. McCLOY) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. ASHBROOK. Mr. Speaker, it seems that we are in for another wave of violence in our overseas embassies. One cannot help but wonder why we do not give combat pay to the men and women who staff our embassies, libraries, information agencies and other outposts which are the subject of recurring attack. It is no secret that this is a direct action of the Communists in instigating these riots and these attacks on what should be a privileged sanctuary under international law. It is no secret that our softness in the face of these overt acts also helps precipitate more of these regrettable incidents.

The attacks seem to come in waves. Last week, another attack in Indonesia was a repeat of past actions in that unfriendly nation. As we study the past record of the major incidents, I wonder if we are entering again the monsoon season of riots, flag burnings, and violence. I also wonder what our State Department will do about it. Here is a list of some of the recent attacks:

ATTACKS ON AMERICAN GOVERNMENT PROPERTY, 1964-65

October 24: Sudanese students break into embassy in Khartoum, Sudan and ransack USIS library.

October 27: Mob smashes windows at USIS office in Bolivia.

November 4: Bolivian students damage two more USIS offices.

November 10: Mob attacks embassy in Khartoum.

November 25: Demonstrators stone embassy in Bulgaria.

November 26: Embassy in Cairo is attacked and mob burns J. F. Kennedy Memorial Library.

November 26: African students damage embassy in Prague.

November 28: Students shatter 56 windows in Moscow embassy.

December 4: Indonesians burn books at USIS center in Jakarta.

December 7: Indonesians ransack USIS library at Surabaya.

January 9: USIS library in Panama City is totally destroyed.

January 22: Buddhists march on embassy in Saigon, stone library.

January 23: Buddhists ransack consulate in Hue, South Vietnam.

February 9: Mob breaks 200 windows in Moscow embassy.

February 9: Embassy in Uruguay is pelted with stones.

February 13: African and Asian students ransack legation in Budapest.

February 13: Mob smashes windows of USIS building in Malaysia.

February 15: Indonesia seizes USIS library at Jakarta after riot.

February 15: Legation in Sofia, Bulgaria is stoned by Asians and Africans.

February 16: Mob tears down flag at embassy in Uganda.

February 16: Indonesia seizes USIS center in Jakarta after students storm it.

February 16: Venezuelan students stone embassy in Caracas.

February 18: Indonesians storm consulate in Medan, tear down flag.

February 28: Mob invades ambassador's home in Jakarta.

March 4: Students attack embassy in Moscow.

IF THEY PAID THEIR DEBTS

(Mr. ASHBROOK (at the request of Mr. McCLOY) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. ASHBROOK. Mr. Speaker, the question is often asked in letters from constituents or in discussions with them back in the district "If other nations paid the debts they owe the United States would our gold situation, balance-of-payments problem, and our general financial difficulties be eased?" The answer to the question would seem to be that we would at least receive a boost that we don't now see in sight. France's President de Gaulle has attacked the dollar and is endeavoring to build up the franc. He has called on our gold and silver reserves despite the fact that France owes us over \$7 billion and the great bulk of this has been in default for many years now.

These debts are separate from aid programs, lend lease and other programs which poured tens of billions of dollars overseas. These are officially carried on U.S. books as debts.

I personally believe that we should not allow France to draw any of our gold or silver reserves until they pay up. Uncle Sugar has been too good and we are all paying for it now. Here is the table of outstanding debts still owed to the United States:

World War I debt still owed to U.S. Government

	Billions
Britain	\$9.380
France	6.510
Italy	2.245
Belgium	.665
Russia	.635
Poland	.445
Czechoslovakia	.265
Other	.355

World War II and postwar debt still owed to U.S. Government

	Billions
Britain	\$8.997
India	2.290
Brazil	.662
Japan	.642
Pakistan	.729
France	.637
Turkey	.461
Yugoslavia	.475
Chile	.443
Spain	.392
United Arab Republic	.364
Israel	.366
Argentina	.351
China (Nationalist)	.303
Iran	.249
Colombia	.248
Germany	.226
Morocco	.207
Russia	.211

World War II and postwar debt still owed to U.S. Government—Continued

	Billions
Mexico	\$0.199
Indonesia	.189
Greece	.150
Venezuela	.138
Peru	.126
Other	2.111

(Source: U.S. Treasury, U.S. Department of Commerce.)

(Mr. MINSHALL (at the request of Mr. McCLOY) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. MINSHALL'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

(Mr. CONTE (at the request of Mr. McCLOY) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. CONTE'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

UNITED REPUBLICANS OF AMERICA

The SPEAKER. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. WELTNER] is recognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. WELTNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. MOELLER].

Mr. MOELLER. Mr. Speaker, something that calls itself the United Republicans of America has announced its intention to purge certain Members from Congress in the 1966 general election.

I must confess that I know little of this particular organization—one needs a scorecard these days to keep track of the weird political groups that have been springing up like weeds in the past few years.

But I was able to find out that the advisory board of the self-styled United Republicans of America is composed of ultrasegregationists from Alabama and Mississippi in addition to several other individuals who never have been and never will be in the mainstream of political thinking in this country.

None of its leaders or members, so far as I can determine, live in my 10th Congressional District or anywhere else in the State of Ohio. This is not surprising. The people of Ohio have never lent their support to extremist movements, either on the far left or the far right.

While I personally welcome the opposition of the URA, I do resent a bunch of carpetbaggers from Alabama and Mississippi and other States far removed from Ohio trying to force their strange views on the people whom I am privileged to represent.

However, I am quite sure that the United Republicans of America will find that southeastern Ohioans are intelligent enough and capable enough to make their own political decisions without outside pressure and meddling.

The real tragedy of organizations like the United Republicans of America is that they have lost faith in democracy. They have no sense of loyalty to the es-

August 11, 1965

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

19245

South Vietnam, leaving the country in the hands of the winner of the election.

It would be wonderful if we could reasonably expect that this course of action would result in a free, independent South Vietnam. But all logic and reason indicates that this action would be entirely contrary to sound policy. We must stand firm in South Vietnam to show that aggression cannot be successful.

HOT POTATO

Nobody would want to exclude the possibility that the suggested course of action would be reasonable at some future date. All Americans would be grateful if the United Nations were to acquire effectiveness in stopping aggression.

But to imagine that the U.N. can now step into the Vietnam situation and solve it in a way consistent with the principles of human freedom and national self-determination is to engage in wishful thinking.

Following are just a few of the facts which work against the logic of the suggestion: First, the U.N. machinery is paralyzed by refusal of the Soviet Union and France to pay for its share of U.N. peace-keeping operations in accord with a ruling of the World Court, and now we are told that we shall abandon our attempts to collect these assessments; second, the U.N. itself does not show any willingness to tackle the problem, and the major delegations seem to prefer that the United States keep this "hot potato" in its own hands; third, Communists would not agree to any elections except under conditions which guarantee their own success; and fourth, the concept of free elections, which as Americans we take for granted as something achievable, is a concept which has yet to penetrate to most Vietnamese people who cannot be expected to participate in free elections as we understand them.

Until these facts are reversed, an American call for U.N.-sponsored elections in South Vietnam as the determining basis for solution would simply be a covering excuse for us to wash our hands of the situation and yield to Communist aggression against innocent people.

ACHESON'S POSITION

But that, Mr. Speaker, is just what the gentlemen who engaged in the August 3 discussion want us to do. Either deliberately or subconsciously, they would prefer that we get out of Vietnam. They feel that we have no interest there, that we are morally wrong in being there, and that if there is such a thing as Communist aggression against innocent people, the problem can somehow be solved if we leave Vietnam.

This conclusion regarding the nature of their position is supported at the very beginning of the August 3 discussion where former Secretary of State Dean Acheson is quoted as of January 12, 1950. At that time Mr. Acheson stated as U.S. policy that the defense perimeter in which we were interested "runs from the Ryukyus to the Philippine Islands."

He said that so far as the military security of other areas in the Pacific is

concerned "no person can guarantee these areas against military attack." He referred then to the United Nations as the place where "initial reliance" would have to be placed in case of such an attack.

Our colleagues on August 3 said Acheson's words "were valid then and they are valid now."

This is a remarkable phenomenon. The 1950 Acheson speech was indeed a significant statement of U.S. policy, but in the reverse way that our colleagues on August 3 concluded. It was significant because it announced to the world that we were not interested in defending South Korea against attack.

Less than 6 months after Secretary Acheson made the statement South Korea was attacked by the Communist North, and I do not need here to review the tragedy that resulted.

It is true that the United Nations did provide help in meeting the situation in Korea. But the lessons to be learned from the experience are, first, that the U.S. announcement served as a virtual invitation for the Communists to attack without fear of U.S. assistance in the defense of South Korea, and, secondly, that even with the U.N. at the height of its influence, and even with the absence of the Soviet Union paving the way for U.N. participation without a Soviet veto, it was U.S. military effort which was largely essential for the resistance, and U.S. peacemaking efforts were largely responsible for bringing about a solution.

Conditions in the Korean situation were vastly different from conditions in the current Vietnam situation, and this fact further works against a U.N.-sponsored solution in Vietnam.

The Dean Acheson speech of January 1950 was indeed a significant statement of U.S. policy. It was folly, and has been considered so by responsible persons ever since. And to his credit, Dean Acheson has since that time come to take a more realistic and logical approach toward Asian communism and the problems it presents.

Today Dean Acheson is one of our most astute statesmen in foreign policy matters. His advice on the need for free world unity of purpose and his judgment on other foreign policy issues has, since 1950, proven to be correct. He has come a long way in his thinking since 1950.

FAULTY LOGIC

He has written some interesting articles recently, among them one called "Advice to Young Academic Propagandists," in the Reporter magazine for August 12, 1965. It relates to this discussion because the position on Vietnam taken by our colleagues as I have mentioned is generally the same position taken by the academic people about whom Dean Acheson writes.

In the article he is critical of academic people who attack U.S. foreign policy based on faulty logic growing essentially out of what he calls "the principal academic political motive" which is fear.

Further, if it was the purpose of the August 3 statement to put Dean Acheson in the position of placing major reliance

on the United Nations for solving the Vietnam situation, it will be useful to refer to another Acheson statement.

In April of 1960 he wrote an article called The Premise of American Foreign Policy which is important, coming as it did 10 years after the 1950 speech, which our colleagues mentioned on August 3.

In that article, Dean Acheson wrote that if the non-Communist nations were to establish an "equilibrium" with the ambitious Communist powers "There must be no further diminishment of that part of the world which now lies outside the domain of Russian or Chinese communism."

He wrote of the need for the combining of national efforts into greater efforts directed by a central leadership.

No one except the United States is strong enough to exercise this leadership, and sometimes the United States shows neither the desire nor the understanding for this task. Indeed, a key question of the 20th century is whether the United States can develop this desire and this understanding. If she cannot, then the Sino-Soviet drive for global hegemony will remain unchallenged.

Mr. Acheson went on to write of the role of the United Nations:

The United Nations, insofar as it believes that by its votes and by its debates it is accomplishing anything, could not be more mistaken. In fact, it can be harmful. Therefore, we cannot look to that organization by itself for a solution to problems. We must look to our own understanding of the problems and to our own will and the will of others to solve them.

Perhaps most significantly of all, Dean Acheson in 1960 seemed to be talking to those of us in 1965 who would use a sense of "moral indignation" in opposing a U.S. position of determination against Communist aggression in Vietnam:

Self-deception is very easy in a democracy. * * * the people themselves want to believe, some concrete evidence to the contrary, that this is a good world inhabited by none but men of good will. Such illusion should not be mistaken for morality.

Foreign policy in the Eisenhower-Dulles years met with partial success in establishing a firm position of American leadership, though these efforts were thwarted with alarmed cries of "brinkmanship" and a widespread failure to comprehend what it was that the Government was trying to do.

In the late 1950's we were engaged in efforts to build the economies of Laos and South Vietnam and efforts to strengthen their ability to defend themselves against Communist aggression. But the U.S. position was negatively influenced by our tendency to misplace our concept of morality.

We preferred not to face the reality already present there, and we barely noticed when, for example, the Vietcong shot and killed two Americans and several Vietnamese who were sitting watching a movie at Bien Hoa one evening in July 1958.

ILLUSIONS

Mr. Acheson said in 1960 that leaders are tempted to deceive the people in foreign policy. The people want to be-

19246

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

August 11, 1965

lieve in a world of international morality, and political leaders do not like to damage the illusion. It is my contention that in the years 1961 through 1964 we fell victim to our illusions. We preferred not to face reality. As a result, through a series of unsure, vacillating actions we presented only a foggy picture of our understanding of the need for U.S. leadership of non-Communist nations, of our readiness to meet the tests which accompany a national responsibility in an imperfect world, and of our determination to stand firm in defense of Communist aggression.

I must say parenthetically, Mr. Speaker, that I certainly have not always agreed with Dean Acheson, but it is interesting that at least he recognizes some of his errors in assessing the Communist intention. And it is also interesting that his later statements completely cut the ground out from under those who attempted to use him for support on August 3.

In 1961 it was as though we had learned no lessons of the Acheson and Dulles years. Where Indochina was concerned it was clear beyond any doubt by that time that Communist aggression in Laos and Vietnam was on the move.

And in 1962 in Laos we arranged a kind of truce between the Communist Pathet Lao aggressors and those who were opposing aggression, even though we had to turn our backs on the anti-Communists to do it. The result of the truce was a guarantee to the Vietcong that the Ho Chi Minh trail was safe in their hands so they could funnel men and equipment into South Vietnam from North Vietnam.

REASON TO DOUBT

In these actions we gave the Asian Communists cause to believe that they could continue their efforts without concern that effective resistance would be encountered. They had much reason to doubt our understanding and determination.

Today, though we have apparently made some progress, clearly the problem is still with us. Several Members of the other body have been protesting our national determination for several months.

One of the publications to which I referred earlier publishes in full the speeches of North Vietnamese leaders, as well as editorials from Vietcong newspapers in Hanoi, while at the same time contriving ways to paint a picture of our position as aggressive and generally immoral.

The President of the United States has found it necessary to state over and over again why it is that we are engaged in Vietnam, and to emphasize our determination.

And in addition to the August 3 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD statement which I have discussed, on August 2 a similar statement was made on the floor of the House. It attempts to show that the United States "must take a full measure of responsibility" for failure of the Geneva agreements.

The gentleman making the statement says that this country gave active encouragement to South Vietnam to re-

nounce the agreements, and that we worked to prevent the International Control Commission, ICC, from performing effectively its function as keeper of the peace since 1954.

In arguing against increased U.S. military strength in Vietnam as ordered by President Johnson, the gentleman speaking on August 2 seeks to show that our presence in Vietnam was wrong from the start. And to show this he even goes back to the specters of Senator Knowland, Senator McCarthy, Chiang Kai-shek, and the "brinkmanship" I mentioned earlier.

He refers to the International Control Commission as established by the Geneva agreements and says it has not worked. And he is correct. The ICC has not been effective in preventing aggression in Vietnam.

But the gentleman attempts to show that the failure of the ICC has been due to the United States.

The fact is that the Communists never wanted the ICC to be effective and actively prevented it from doing its job.

The Commission is made up of representatives of India, Canada, and Poland. India acts as coordinator of the Commission in view of its role as a nation committed to neither the Communist bloc nor the anti-Communist nations.

It is a matter of history that the Polish delegates consistently, since the ICC was first established, prevented the Commission from acting to first identify incidents of North Vietnamese aggression and secondly from reporting on it as provided in the Geneva agreements.

The United States did not sign the Geneva agreements on Indochina of 1954. Inferences have been made that the reason we did not sign was that we did not want peace in Indochina or that we somehow had a subversive plan for interfering with the people's right for economic and political independence.

NONAGGRESSION

The reason we did not sign the Geneva agreements was that they sanctioned the division of Vietnam into two parts, with the Communist government of Ho Chi Minh given authority in North Vietnam under conditions which pointed surely to eventual Communist control of the whole country.

We were not working against economic and political independence for the Vietnamese people, but just to the contrary, we were working for it.

Further, we supported the principle of nonaggression. We stated that the United States would refrain from the threat or use of force to disturb the agreements and that we would view any renewal of aggression in violation of the agreements as a threat to international peace and security.

Since 1954 the United States has conscientiously encouraged the South Vietnam Government to assist the ICC. The South Vietnam Government has exerted great effort to respond carefully to ICC communications, to provide full information as requested, to provide housing and transportation for the ICC teams, and in general to offer every help possible to the ICC to carry out its responsibilities.

Until the end of 1961 the United States meticulously kept its military and civilian mission people in Vietnam strictly within the limits of the Geneva accords.

On the other hand the North Vietnamese Government and the Polish delegations to the ICC since 1954 engaged in a long series of actions to thwart the ICC from performing its function. They employed a long list of tactics to circumvent the spirit as well as the letter of the purpose of the ICC as provided in the Geneva agreements.

A SOCCER TEAM

For example, while the United States and South Vietnam since 1954 have provided complete information regarding arrivals and departures of military personnel in South Vietnam as called for in the Geneva agreements, the opposite has been true in the north.

In the 1954-61 period it was common knowledge that Russian and Chinese Communist military personnel were observed in Hanoi and other parts of North Vietnam frequently. And yet in that period only one arrival of military personnel was reported to the ICC—that of a Communist Chinese soccer team.

During these years the United States and South Vietnam also provided convincing evidence on several occasions to the ICC regarding North Vietnamese violations of the Geneva agreements.

As a result, the ICC submitted a report on June 2, 1962, stating in part as follows:

Having examined the complaints and the supporting material sent by the South Vietnamese mission, the Committee has come to the conclusion that in specific instances there is evidence to show that armed and unarmed personnel, arms, munitions, and other supplies have been sent from North Vietnam to South Vietnam with the object of supporting, organizing, and carrying out hostile activities, including armed attacks. These acts are in violation of articles 10, 19, 24, and 27 of the Geneva agreements.

That report also stated that the North Vietnamese Army worked for inciting, encouraging, and supporting hostile activities in South Vietnam aimed at the overthrow of the South Vietnam Government. The Polish delegate to the ICC dissented from the conclusions.

There were several tactics used by the North Vietnamese to prevent the ICC from doing its job with regard to inspections of material in transport so that military equipment could be detected and intercepted.

First. On frequent occasions when an ICC team in the North was scheduled to inspect a port or an air terminal the North Vietnamese liaison officer would simply say there were no vehicles available with which to make the trip.

Second. On other occasions when an inspection was due the Polish member of the ICC team would say he was ill and could not make the trip, thus preventing an inspection. Work of the ICC required cooperation of all three delegations. One member could veto anything, and the Communists found that this kind of "troika" arrangement worked to their advantage.

Third. On still other occasions ICC teams in the North were told that they could not inspect given cargoes since the

August 11, 1965

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

19247

invoices or other documents were not available. In these cases the North Vietnamese would say the cargoes were merely consumer goods. And as in other such cases the Polish member would adopt the position of the Vietcong, the Canadian member would want to proceed with effective work, and the Indian member would decide that to do nothing would be the expeditious course, thus rendering the ICC ineffective.

CURRENT OBSTRUCTION

In South Vietnam the ICC has been accorded full opportunities for travel throughout the country. In the North the ICC has been harassed and at various times severely limited in its opportunity even to locate itself at significant places.

In the words of the State Department this week, for example:

Since February 13, 1965, the authorities of the North have refused to allow the ICC teams which the Geneva Agreements specified should be established in Lao Kay, Lang Son, Tien Yen, Vinh, Dong Hoi, Haiphong, and Muong-Sen to remain in those cities. Therefore, at the present time the sole ICC representation in North Vietnam is located at Hanoi. Such a restriction, which is the culmination of all the obstacles imposed by the North over the years during which the ICC has existed, prevents the ICC from fulfilling virtually any of the functions assigned to it.

Mr. Speaker, I present these facts in an effort to show that anyone who depicts the United States and/or South Vietnam as violators of the quest for peace in Vietnam is grossly misinformed.

And efforts by elected representatives of American people to falsify the American position in the quest for peace provide shocking evidence of what Dean Acheson was concerned with when he referred to the need for Americans to view the world with a realistic concept of what constitutes morality.

Responsible, thoughtful Americans will rather agree with the Indianapolis Unitarian minister who, in speaking on this subject in June said:

I reject this charge of moral turpitude leveled against our Government's policy in Vietnam. I reject it because I believe it to be tainted with immoral considerations. Many with clean hearts are being dragged into this position either through their single-minded vision of the right or through simple naivete.

I reject this charge in the second place because it is an erroneous charge. Our Nation, and the people within it, must resist this attack upon its moral integrity. I say that my Government is as morally right as, in this moment of history, it is possible to be.

(Mr. OTTINGER (at the request of Mr. SCHMIDHAUSER) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. OTTINGER'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

TO PERMIT FEDERAL EMPLOYEES TO PURCHASE SHARES OF FEDERAL- OR STATE-CHARTERED CREDIT UNIONS THROUGH VOLUNTARY PAYROLL ALLOTMENT

(Mr. ST GERMAIN (at the request of Mr. SCHMIDHAUSER) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. ST GERMAIN. Mr. Speaker, today I am introducing a bill which will provide for further improvement in fringe benefits available to Federal employees by authorizing them to purchase shares in their credit unions through deductions from their paychecks.

In recent years, the payroll program of the Federal Government has been improved to provide wider fringe benefits. It is now possible for Federal employees to authorize payroll deductions for diverse purposes other than the traditional ones of taxes and retirement. Among the deductions now permitted are those for group health and life insurance, union dues, U.S. savings bonds, and, in certain instances, charitable contributions. The usual deductions for civil service retirement or social security and Federal and State income taxes are, of course, still being made.

This rather complete list shows that the Federal employee has been moving toward parity in fringe benefits with his fellow workers in State and municipal governments, business and industry. My bill would extend this progress one step further by permitting the Federal employee the benefit of a regular savings plan enjoyed by millions of workers using credit union payroll deduction plans outside the Federal Government.

Under the bill's terms, the Government would be reimbursed for the cost of making the deduction. I anticipate that this cost will be about the same as the 2 cents per check currently charged Government employee unions participating in the union dues program.

Furthermore, my bill would remove an inequity within the Department of Defense wherein civilian employees of the Department are not permitted to make credit union share purchases by means of payroll deductions, but military personnel are permitted to do so through the allotment procedure. I feel that all Federal personnel, civilian and military, should have available to them the same credit union savings program, since this program materially contributes to the financial independence of the members.

Credit unions comprising Federal employees may be chartered either by the States or the Federal Government. They have over 2,000,000 Federal employee members and over \$900 million in savings.

REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT BEFORE THE WATER EMERGENCY CONFERENCE

(Mr. CELLER (at the request of Mr. SCHMIDHAUSER) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. CELLER. Mr. Speaker, I am more than pleased to have this opportunity to set forth the far-reaching remarks of President Johnson before the Water Emergency Conference at the White House today. Those of us who were fortunate enough to hear these words spoken—Governors, mayors, Members of the House and Senate, members of the Cabinet, and officials of the Government—feel their impact keenly and I am sure all agree with me that a statement of such unmistakable significance should be read by everyone.

The statement follows:

Secretary Udall, distinguished Governors, members of the Cabinet, Chairman Seaborg, Mr. Ackley, first, I am happy that I have been able to hear some of the discussion. I deeply regret that I have not heard more, and I do want to have you share with me some of your private thinking. If it is agreeable, and you don't mind the quality of the lunch, we'll just have lunch together when we get through.

It may be a little late to your next meeting, but the folks in the other wing are accustomed to having guests on short notice—as I know they are in your capitals—and so if you bear in mind anything that you want to raise, we will do it during the lunch hour.

Second, apropos of the very excellent suggestion made by Governor Rockefeller, who has talked to me about this a number of times, I followed his pollution plank with great interest. He's discussed that with me, and I hope our people can be helpful in what he's been discussing. I rather doubt there will be any comprehensive appropriations possible in the next few weeks that we will be here to carry out one of the suggestions that you made, although I will ask the Director of the Budget and the Secretary of the Interior and the head of the Corps of Engineers to get any very specific ideas you have, after these teams make their visits, and be available for our budget hearings, which will begin September, October, and November in anticipation of the Congress' return in January.

I called you here today in the face of a 4-year drought that has been unequalled in the northeast section of our country. As I said earlier, I have known drought in the Southwest and I have seen what it can do, and I still have a grateful heart for what our then President Eisenhower did in that emergency. And I want to do everything that the White House can do to work with you in this one.

In other sections of this Nation, in times past, the challenge of the drought has been met. In the Northeast, though, it is facing a serious drought for the first time, really, in its history, and I am confident that the steps that we can take together in the challenge that does face us will enable us, somehow, to meet the test, and that the challenge will be overcome.

19248

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

August 11, 1965

Now, this is a time for action. It is a time for Federal action, but that never substitutes for State or local action, as you all point out when the mayors meet and the Governors meet and talk about States rights and local rights, and so forth. And it is not any substitute for private action.

So, the big thing we must start out with is that we must act together, if that is possible, and I know with this group we can. We must act together, first, to solve the immediate crisis that is facing us. We must act together to prepare for a possible fifth year of drought—as you just said.

We must act together to assure our citizens of the northeast, and their children, that the supply of water that they need for their industry, and their health, and their recreation is assured and guaranteed as far into the future as we can see now.

So, as a result, I have already tried to mobilize the Federal Government into action. The Department of Agriculture, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, the Department of the Interior, the Federal Power Commission, the Corps of Engineers, the Office of Civilian Defense, and the Office of Emergency Planning—headed by one of your most popular and able former Governors, Governor Ellington—are already focusing their efforts on the problems in the northeast.

To continue to fulfill that responsibility, I am directing the Secretary of the Interior, today, to dispatch tonight, water crisis teams to the five cities that are represented here today.

I have asked Secretary Udall to make hard and fast decisions immediately and on the spot to assist each affected community.

I have directed the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of the Army Engineers to move as rapidly as possible on all vital water supply projects in the area.

And how does that happen?

No. 1, we are going to add \$400,000 to the Tocks Island Reservoir project in the Delaware River Basin immediately, and this will quicken construction of that project by at least a year.

Second, we are going to add \$400,000 to the Bettsville, Pa., project, and that will greatly expedite construction there.

Third, we are going to add \$100,000 to the reservoir project at Blue Marsh, Pa., so we can speed up the planning and design there.

Fourth, we are going to add \$150,000 to plan a \$6 million water supply addition to the Prompton Reservoir project.

Fifth, we're going to begin planning a new \$11 million water supply project at Trexler Reservoir.

I have asked my Water Resources Council to consult with each of you on a daily basis and to report to the President on any additional action that they think can be taken. Should the Council find that additional White House action is required, I want you to know that I am prepared to do whatever is necessary and to do it immediately.

Now, water problems are no longer limited by man-made State or municipal boundaries. These problems are regional and we recognize them as such.

Many years ago, I had a study made—one of the first in the Nation—of a regional water problem we had. We had to take into consideration the effect on many sections, many regions, many States, and some dozen rivers, before we could have a real comprehensive water plan. And as a result of that survey, we developed one. So, I am, therefore, initiating a \$4 million comprehensive water resource planning survey for the entire Northeast—all the way from Virginia to Maine.

Now, for the long-range, I have directed the Secretary-designate Gardner of Health, Education and Welfare, and my very able and imaginative—and I hope he did not get me out on these goals too far, I hope they are

realistic—science adviser, Dr. Hornig, to start to work with you to prepare within 6 months a plan of action for pollution control.

I am asking Secretary Udall to work with Dr. Hornig and Dr. Ackley, of my Council of Economic Advisers, and Dr. Seaborg to examine the potential of desalting for the Northeast, and to give me a report on the potentialities and possibilities there within 6 months.

As Nelson told you—as you have observed—I have just signed a bill—I hope you still have that pen to take home with you. I am increasing the funds for the desalting program by \$185 million. That's \$175 more than it was last week. They had me down to \$10 million for a period there.

I know you are really interested in this whole field, but in the field of conservation, in the field of highway improvement—sometimes called beautification—in the field of pollution, we need all the leadership we can get. We don't need it here at the White House. We need it in the House and Senate and in the committees that have those matters under their control.

I hope that you will take a look at that situation. We have a stronger pollution bill in the Senate than we did in the House. We have it in conference now, and it is in conference, and we want it to come out of that conference, and I beseech you and I implore you and I invite you to render me the same kind of effective assistance in that field that Governor Scranton did when Appalachia was pending.

The pollution bill, this highway improvement bill, the conservation measures that apply to your States—those decisions are being made right this session. They are going to be decided in the next 3 weeks. And I think they will all be decided favorably—and maybe more expeditiously and maybe a little more favorably if your views are known to your people from your States.

Now, top priority is going to be given to every one of these problems that exists in the Northeast. You are in trouble and when you are in trouble we're in trouble. And we are going to be there to help.

I have told you that this is what we can do and this is what we will do.

But water supply really is a local responsibility. Only you are going to be able to conserve the water that you now have. There is not much I can do about the third of Bob Wagner's water that we don't know where it is going.

You must devise and you must enforce the necessary procedures to avoid the waste of water by leakage or by unnecessary use. And you can do a good deal about the unnecessary pollution. The pollution that is taking place in this country, and the effect that a few industrial plants are having on the future of our country, is absolutely disgraceful. I don't want to put it on your doorstep. I'm putting it on mine here—right here on the Potomac, where George Washington threw his dollar. It is disgraceful.

I was out on it last night and you can hardly go down the river without recognizing and wondering why we have been so shortsighted these years. And it has got to stop. We have got to do something about it. And good men, and great men, and wise men, and good Americans—like yourselves—can do something about it.

You can do it in your leadership in your States, and you can do it in your speeches, and you can do it here in Washington. I need all the help I can get in that field.

I have been getting a lot of it. Your brother is giving a lot of it. I want to give you at lunch a book that he has had published in that very field, showing some of the beauties of America and also some of the shame.

So, as leaders of your States, and as leaders of your cities, I think if you do nothing else out of this White House conference ex-

cept go back and urge your citizens to use the water they now have—but use it with prudence, and use it wisely, and use it without contaminating it and without polluting it—and to say to these giants and titans, who may not have had the appreciation of all the conservation angles that some professor would have, that you take a new look at what you are doing to the water that belongs to all the people. It is not your private water to do what you want to do with it.

So, no one will solve this problem by themselves. No one single program is going to solve it. But the expertise of the Federal Government is available to you and it is going to help you and it is going to try to provide what leadership it can.

Comprehensive planning is available to you and it can help you, and we are going to use it. Antipollution and desalting programs can help, and if you will help me get the pollution bill through the Congress, the desalting bill, we will give you some matching appropriation, and we can and well help.

The Senate passed \$200 million and the House was ready for \$10 million, and we compromised for \$185 million—but you understand those things. That one is behind us. But this conference might have had something to do with helping along a little bit on that.

These programs must be welded together by men working together. And they must work together into an effective weapon to end the current crisis, and to prevent any such crises from developing again.

There are many more ambitious programs that could be developed. Where they are realistic I will ask our people to help, within the limits of our resources. We will try to help match you on a local and State basis to meet them.

We are going to have severe drains because of the new programs we are passing in other fields this year. I have signed at least 40 major bills in this session—more major bills have been signed, I think, than in any other period in the history of the Congress.

That is the work of the Congress. It is not the work of anyone else. And you sent these men to Congress. They have acted as Americans.

I heard Secretary Rusk say the other day that if you go into the Foreign Relations Committee you could not tell when you were hearing FULBRIGHT and AIKEN—if you were a foreigner—which one was the Republican and which one was the Democrat. All you knew was that both of them were Americans. And the Congress is pretty well functioning that way this year.

Some of our people don't always see things as we do, but we can expect that. But these 40 bills are the fruits of their labor—and we still have 40 more to come. They are coming every day, right down the line.

We're going to have an Urban Affairs Department this afternoon. We're going to have a public works and area redevelopment bill this afternoon—I hope—unless I'm disappointed. They're voting in the House and Senate now.

But we do want, before we leave here, something that is important to you. Do you know that the tourist trade has picked up unbelievably abroad? And if you travel over some of our country you can see why people want to get away from it. Yet a few men are coming in and insisting that we keep these dirty, little, old signs up in these little, dirty, old towns. That this is going to affect free enterprise, and this is going to do this and that—while our tourist trade is picking up, and picking up, and picking up.

When I leave this meeting I'm going out to talk to the "See the U.S.A." group that is traveling the U.S.A. to try to see and point out the glories of this country.

My wife is going in one direction, my daughter has been going in another direc-

August 11, 1965

I would thing that industry and government in New York State would want to fully endorse this principle.

At the present time, a section of New York State penal code passed last year is used to prevent State government from releasing specific information to either the public or Federal agencies. I find it incredible that the basic pollution information telling us about the nature of our industrial pollution is not available to either the Federal Government or the public.

The U.S. Public Health Service spent over \$1 million in making a detailed study of pollution in the Detroit River waters of Lake Erie because the specific information on pollution was not available. I would hope that a similar study would not be required for the Buffalo-Niagara area. Yet if the basic pollution information is not made available, I would urge that a study of this type be conducted.

4. Schedule for pollution control: The Federal conferees in Cleveland also recommended a schedule for the elimination of pollution. State representatives should either endorse this schedule or set a date at which a more acceptable schedule can be agreed to.

5. Dredging: I also urge the State conferees to agree to the recommendation that the Corps of Engineers work out a plan by which material dredged from Lake Erie and its tributaries, such as the Buffalo River, be disposed of in a manner which will protect the quality of Lake Erie's water.

CONCLUSION

The control of water pollution is a complex subject of critical importance to New York State and the rest of the Nation. The question is not so much whether we will have water, but what price we pay for water. New York State and the other States on the Great Lakes have been magnificently endowed with clear fresh water. It is up to us to keep from fouling it to the point where it cannot be used without expensive treatment. To do this we must act now.

New York State has been a leader in many areas, in education, in industrial development, and in transportation for example. Yet when foreign visitors ask where they can see effective water pollution control, they are sent to Indiana or Michigan and not New York State. New York State can be a leader in this critical area. I urge that we take the steps to gain this leadership.

John F. Kennedy
U.S. PRIME-ASSET: EXCELLENCE
OF RUSK, McNAMARA

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, this Nation is blessed with competent and articulate leadership in the State Department and the Defense Department. Critics may disagree strongly with our policy in Vietnam, but, Mr. President, anyone—critic or supporter—who heard Secretaries Rusk and McNamara defend it in an hour-long interview on the Columbia Broadcasting System Monday night must have been impressed by the intelligence, the logic, the understanding with which Rusk and McNamara defended our Vietnam policies.

Unfortunately, television—despite its unrivaled impact on millions of people—is highly perishable. Rusk and McNamara spoke out in words that must have persuaded many an American, but the words vanish on the wind. This is why I feel that the transcript of that broadcast should be printed in full in the RECORD.

Mr. President, to give the Senate a little of the flavor of this broadcast let me quote from Secretary Rusk's reply to CBS

Correspondent Reasoner's question of how American honor is involved in our action in South Vietnam. This is Rusk's reply, in part:

We have a very simple commitment to South Vietnam. It derives out of a south-east Asia treaty, out of the bilateral arrangements that President Eisenhower made with the Government of South Vietnam, out of regular authorization and appropriations of the Congress in giving aid to South Vietnam, out of the resolution of the Congress of last August, out of the most formal declarations of three Presidents and both political parties. Now there's no need to parse these commitments in great detail. The fact is that we know we have a commitment. The South Vietnamese know we have a commitment. The Communist world knows we have a commitment. The rest of the world knows it. Now this means that the integrity of the American commitment is at the heart of this problem. I believe that the integrity of the American commitment is the principal structure of peace throughout the world.

Let me repeat that last sentence. Said Rusk:

I believe that the integrity of the American commitment is the principal structure of peace throughout the world.

Can we doubt that statement by our Secretary of State—and if we grant it—here is a very big part of our answer to what we must do in South Vietnam.

Secretary Rusk continued:

We have 42 allies. Those alliances were approved by overwhelming votes of our Senate. We didn't go into those alliances through some sense of amiability, or through some philanthropic attitude toward other nations. We went into it because we considered these alliances utterly essential for the security of our own Nation. Now if our allies, or more particularly, if our adversaries should discover that the American commitment is not worth anything, then the world would face dangers of which we have not yet dreamed, and so it is important for us to make good on that American commitment to South Vietnam.

Mr. President, any fair-minded Member of Congress or any other American citizen who will read this transcript with an open mind must come to the conclusion that this administration's policy in South Vietnam is based on logic and intelligence and that it is overwhelmingly motivated by the desire to secure peace, but a peace that can be stable and enduring, a peace that will permit freedom to persist and grow.

As I said earlier, any reader must be encouraged by the excellent caliber of these top officials of our Government—the men who most closely advise the President of the United States on the crucial problems of war and peace.

I ask unanimous consent that the transcript of the CBS News special report entitled "Vietnam Perspective: 'The Decisions'" be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the text of the broadcast was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From a CBS News special report]

Vietnam Perspective: "THE DECISIONS"
(Part I of four parts, as broadcast over the CBS television network, August 9, 1965),
Participants: Secretary of State Dean Rusk; Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara.

Reporters: CBS News Correspondent Peter Kalischer; CBS News Correspondent Alexander Kendrick, and CBS News Correspondent Harry Reasoner.

Mr. REASONER. Good evening. Across the table from me are the two decisionmakers who sit on the right and left of the President of the United States. This is Secretary of State Dean Rusk, who with the President formulates the foreign policy decisions. This is Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, who with the President formulates the military decisions. Two of my colleagues and I have joined them in the John Quincy Adams Room of the Department of State. Alexander Kendrick, now stationed in Washington, who covered Europe and the Soviet Union for many years, and Peter Kalischer, who has covered the war in Vietnam a long time, maybe longer than any other correspondent. In the past year CBS News has broadcast a half dozen special reports on Vietnam, with foreign dignitaries, professors, hawks and doves and now we are presenting the decisionmakers. I would like to begin by asking both Secretaries two basic questions. First, how is our honor involved in Vietnam and second, how is our security involved in those rice paddies and remote villages and, since sometimes in international relations, security comes before honor, I will ask Mr. McNamara to answer first.

Mr. McNAMARA. First, let me make it clear, Mr. Reasoner, that this is not primarily a military problem. Above all else, I want to emphasize that. It is a battle for the hearts and minds of the people of South Vietnam and will only be won if we make clear to those people that their longrun security depends in the development of a stable political institution and an expanding economy. That is our objective. As a prerequisite to that, we must be able to guarantee their physical security. How does our physical security, our national interest become involved in this? That is your question. Secretary Rusk will elaborate on it, but let me say to start with, that it is apparent that underlying the terror, the harassment of the South Vietnamese by the Vietcong is the purpose and the objective of North Vietnam backed by Communist China to expand Communist control over the peoples of the independent nations of southeast Asia and to use this as a test of their method of expanding control over independent peoples throughout the world, in the underdeveloped areas of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The leaders of those two nations have, on numerous instances, stated this as their purpose. For example, General Giap, who is the head of the North Vietnamese military forces, said not long ago that South Vietnam is the model of the national liberation movement of our time. If the special warfare that the United States is testing in South Vietnam is overcome, then it can be defeated anywhere in the world.

And perhaps more pertinently in relation to Latin America is the comment of Pham Van Dong, who is the Prime Minister of North Vietnam, who said recently, "The experience of our compatriots in South Vietnam attracts the attention of the world, especially the peoples of Latin America." And the interest of the Chinese Communists in advancing Asian communism by force are well known, but I want to call your attention to two important statements emphasizing that. The Peiping People's Daily said about 12 months ago, from Peiping, China, "It's advantageous from the point of view of tactics to refer to the desire for peaceful transition to capitalism to communism, but it would be inappropriate to emphasize that possibility. The Communist Party must never entertain the illusion that the transition to communism can be achieved through the parliamentary road. Violent revolution is the universal law of proletarian revolution. To realize the transition to communism, the

wish to enjoy the lake for boating, swimming or just the magnificent scenery.

The Public Health Service has said in its report dated July 1965: "Lake Erie and its tributaries are polluted. The main body of the lake had deteriorated in quality at a rate many times greater than its normal aging processes, due to *** pollution resulting from the activities of man."

If this pollution worsens, the 855,000 people in New York State and the 2,442,000 people in other States who draw their drinking water directly from Lake Erie will have to turn to other sources for their water supplies. They may be faced with a report on Lake Erie from the New York State Department of Health stating that the lake is not suitable from a sanitary point of view as a permanent source of public water and should only be used as a source of water during grave water shortages.

If this sounds unlikely, I might point out that the Department of Health issued a report of this nature for the Hudson River in 1950. As a result, the citizens of New York City who use about a billion and a quarter gallons of water every day do not draw any water from the 20-billion gallons of fresh water that the Hudson pours into the Atlantic Ocean every day.

The industries in the five States that currently use 4.7 billion gallons of Lake Erie's water daily will be forced to look elsewhere for water. If Lake Erie becomes clogged with algae and the pollution level rises, New York State industry, using 1.6 billion gallons a day for power generation and 350 million gallons a day for cooling or other processes, would be severely crippled. The costs of removing pollution after the fact are much higher than those of preventing a source of water from becoming polluted in the first place.

The residents of New York State along Lake Erie have been particularly fortunate in recent years because they have not been plagued by drought. By contrast, people living in the Mohawk and Hudson River Valleys and other areas of New York State this summer are suffering from the worst drought in almost 100 years. Rural residents in many counties are buying drinking water at costs of 15 cents a gallon and more. A number of communities are already taking emergency measures to obtain additional water. New York City may run out of water in January or February of the coming year if the current drought lasts.

One of the relief measures being considered for New York City involves piping water from Lake Ontario into the Mohawk River to supplement the flow of the Hudson. If Lake Erie and Lake Ontario become too polluted, where will we turn for additional water?

CONTROL PROGRAM FOR NEW YORK STATE

The New York State Legislature has passed during this last session a program which can make some difference, particularly in relation to municipal sewage. Under this program New York State will provide one-third of the funds required by municipalities to construct sewage treatment plants. The Federal Government is being asked to provide the next third, and local communities will be required to contribute the remaining 40 percent.

The voters of New York State are being asked to approve the first part of this program in a referendum item that will be on the ballot this November. I hope the voters will approve the proposed bond issue.

In legislation shortly to be enacted in Congress, the Federal part of this program is being completed. Project size limitations that have hindered use of Federal funds for construction of municipal sewage plants are being increased to assist communities in meeting their sewage treatment plant needs. In addition to the increases in project size limitations, \$50 million is being added to the

funds already authorized, and there are no project size restrictions on this sum.

Thus as a result of the efforts of Congressman McCARTHY, in particular, and many others, a total of \$150 million in Federal funds is expected to be available this year. New York State will be able to qualify for a major share of these sums.

There are, however, other immediate local, State, and Federal steps that can and must be taken now if we are to have any success in combating water pollution over the long run.

LOCAL AND STATE POLLUTION CONTROL

We need more political innovation at the State and local levels, particularly in relation to industrial pollution. Of course, no town or State government likes to tell an industry that they must eliminate their pollution. The economics of plant investment often lead a firm to reply that it will relocate its plant in another State if local pollution controls are enforced. Because there are major differences in State regulations and enforcement of pollution laws, industry can play one municipality or State off against another.

INTERSTATE WATER QUALITY STANDARDS

One of the barriers to effective local and State enforcement is the fact that communities using water from bodies of water crossing State boundaries are currently faced with different pollution standards on each side of a State line. A community cannot reasonably be asked to treat its wastes if the next community does not. If New York and Pennsylvania, or Massachusetts and Rhode Island, or any two or more States are to effectively reduce pollution, common pollution standards and enforcement for the communities sharing a water way must be established on both sides of their common borders.

Control of pollution in Lake Erie is a good example of this problem. Michigan, Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and New York as well as Canada are each individually responsible for the control of pollution flowing into Lake Erie. It has been shown clearly that pollution from each of the States affects the quality of water used by the other States and Canada. Yet there is no common standard of pollution control between the States and Canada. Communities and industry along the lake are being asked to take steps to clean up pollution with no assurance that other locations will be required to do the same thing. Unless common standards are applied, it is difficult to require action from communities and industry.

Yet New York, Massachusetts, Vermont, Maine, and many other States opposed the establishment of Federal interstate water quality standards recommended in the water pollution legislation brought before the Congress this session.

The water quality standards passed by the Senate this year but rejected by the House should be adopted by Congress. I have urged the House conferees to join the Senate in adopting these interstate water quality standards. They are a critical underpinning for State and local antipollution efforts.

LICENSING OF POLLUTION SOURCES AND OTHER FEDERAL POLLUTION CONTROL

We must go beyond the establishment of standards that apply only to interstate waters, and establish and enforce quality standards for all waterways.

I do not believe that continued Federal aid to fight the contamination of water will be available until the States are willing to enforce pollution regulations. There would be no sense in spending large amounts of money to remove municipal pollution in one area only to have a river or stream polluted by the neighboring community, industry, or State.

There are a number of ways in which better pollution control can be exercised.

In Germany and England, for example, which are countries that have already faced the water shortage that we are now experiencing, each source of pollution is licensed by the appropriate river or water basin commission so that there is full knowledge of the pollution that is going into the waterway. And certain kinds of pollution are prohibited.

We could well do the same in the United States. We might, for instance, have a federally established licensing or permit system, with enforcement generally to be accomplished by States and municipalities. The control agency could be given a right of entry and inspection for all licensed sources of pollution. Such a system of licensing would insure that competing firms with pollution problems would be treated alike.

Another source of control might be a user fee applied to each source of pollution on the basis of the cost to the government of removing the pollutants that are discharged. Since collective treatment of waste is less costly, this user fee might cost the polluter less than installing his own purification unit would cost.

ECONOMIC INCENTIVES

I also believe that Federal economic assistance to industry in meeting new pollution standards can be provided through rapid Federal tax write-offs of the cost of acquiring and installing adequate pollution control equipment. Assistance of this type could be useful if coupled with a broad attack on water pollution.

THE LAKE ERIE CONFERENCE

Turning specifically to the current conference:

In the first session of the Water Pollution Conference for Lake Erie held in Cleveland, a number of recommendations were discussed by the conferees and, in most cases, agreed to by the conferees from Michigan, Indiana, and Ohio. We do not know whether New York State or Pennsylvania agreed to these recommendations.

I think that the potential results of this conference are important enough to the 11.2 million people living on the shores of Lake Erie to warrant the participation of New York State. I hope that New York State will now endorse the recommendations of the conference so that the five States and Canada can move ahead with a program to eliminate pollution in Lake Erie.

1. Secondary sewage treatment: Of particular importance are the recommendations that the communities along the lake provide at least secondary treatment of their municipal wastes. New York State has at least 50,000 people who discharge waste into Lake Erie with no treatment at all. It has an additional 1,160,779 residents whose sewage receives only primary treatment before being discharged into the lake. Only 285,000 residents are serviced by secondary sewage treatment plants, a necessity for all municipal waste if we are to prevent the contamination of the lake.

2. Interception of storm and sanitary sewage runoff: Of great importance in the Buffalo area is the need for interception and treatment plants to handle the municipal sewage that normally is washed out into the lake during rain storms.

3. Pollution information: Perhaps the most important recommendation from the standpoint of industrial pollution is the recommendation that specific pollution information from industry and municipalities be reported and maintained in open files by the State agencies controlling pollution.

This information has not been available in the past. In a major step taken in Cleveland last week, a number of industry representatives agreed to make this information available. State representatives from Indiana, Michigan, and Ohio also agreed to the recommendation that this information be collected and made available in open files.

proletariat must wage armed struggle." And to put it even more succinctly, Mao Tsetung said recently, "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." That's why our national security is involved in South Vietnam.

Mr. REASONER. And the honor, Secretary Rusk?

Mr. RUSK. Mr. Reasoner, the answer to this question is extremely simple and need not be complicated. When President Johnson talks about our national honor, he is not using some empty phrase of 18th-century diplomacy. He is talking about the life and death of the nation. Now the essential fact from which we start is that North Vietnam has sent tens of thousands of men and large quantities of arms into South Vietnam to take over that country by force. We have a very simple commitment to South Vietnam. It derives out of a southeast Asia treaty, out of the bilateral arrangements that President Eisenhower made with the Government of South Vietnam, out of regular authorizations an appropriations of the Congress in giving aid to South Vietnam, out of the resolution of the Congress of last August, out of the most formal declarations of three Presidents and both political parties.

Now, there's no need to parse these commitments in great detail. The fact is that we know we have a commitment. The South Vietnamese know we have a commitment. The Communist world knows we have a commitment. The rest of the world knows it. Now this means that the integrity of the American commitment is at the heart of this problem. I believe that the integrity of the American commitment is the principal structure of peace throughout the world. We have 42 allies. Those alliances were approved by overwhelming votes of our Senate. We didn't go into those alliances through some sense of amiability, or through some philanthropic attitude toward other nations. We went into it because we considered these alliances utterly essential for the security of our own Nation. Now if our allies, or more particularly, if our adversaries should discover that the American commitment is not worth anything, then the world would face dangers of which we have not yet dreamed and so it is important for us to make good on that American commitment to South Vietnam.

Mr. KENDRICK. But sir, don't you have to reckon honor at its cost? I mean, it's not an abstract thing. It has to be evaluated and weighed according to what it cost you and what about dishonor? What about the world image that we now present? We're burning villages. We're killing civilians. Now, don't you weigh one against the other?

Mr. RUSK. Well, let me say that you also weigh the cost of dishonor, that is, the failure of an American commitment and I would hope that our own American news media would go to some effort to present a balanced picture of what is going on in South Vietnam. There are thousands of local officials who have been assassinated or kidnapped. There are tens of thousands of South Vietnamese civilians who have been killed or wounded by South Vietnamese—by North Vietnamese mortars and by the constant depredations of these acts of violence against the civilian population. No, there are costs involved in meeting your commitments of honor. There always have been. There always will be, but I would suggest if we look at the history of the last 30 or 40 years, that the cost of not meeting your obligations are far greater than those of meeting your obligations.

Mr. REASONER. Well, having—having set the stage, more or less, with your opening statements, I'd like to start off first in the area of what we hope to achieve there this year and how we're doing militarily and politically. Peter?

Mr. KALISCHER. Well, I would like to bring up the subject of who we're committed to. You mentioned the fact, Mr. Secretary, that we have a commitment to the Vietnamese Government. That government has changed some 7 or 8 times in the last 18 to 20 months and when we say we have this commitment to this government, are we reasonably assured that this government represents the people of South Vietnam, or even a large number of the people of South Vietnam?

Mr. RUSK. Well, we recognize, of course, that there are difficulties in the top leadership of South Vietnam and have been over the months, but that does not mean that our commitment to the nation and to the people of South Vietnam has changed any more than the fact that we've had three changes of government in our own Government during the period of this commitment.

Mr. KALISCHER. It's slightly different.

Mr. RUSK. The impression we have is that among the 14 million people of South Vietnam, we do not find any significant group outside of the Vietcong itself, relatively limited in numbers, that seems to be looking to Hanoi for the answer. The Buddhists are not; the Catholics are not. The other sects are not. The Montagnards are not. The million Cambodians living in South Vietnam are not. In other words, we—I think, would know very quickly, because we have lots of Americans living throughout the countryside; we would know very quickly if these people of South Vietnam wanted the program of the liberation front, or wanted domination from Hanoi. That we do not find. Now there have been some problems in the government in Saigon as you know, and we and the leaders in South Vietnam have tried to work very closely together to try to resolve those problems, but that is quite separate from the problem of whether Hanoi should be permitted to come in by force and impose a solution on the people of South Vietnam by force. If these people in South Vietnam were left alone in peace, these problems that you're concerned about and we're concerned about, could be worked out by normal, peaceful means.

Mr. KALISCHER. By Department of Defense statistics sir, I think we now estimate there are 190,000 to 200,000 Vietcong with a commensurate influx of North Vietnamese and only three battalions have been directly identified as being North Vietnamese Army battalions. Against this, in Vietnam, we have now, with the American commitment of about 100,000 and 545,000 Vietnamese, more troops fighting the Vietcong than the French had and their Vietnamese auxiliaries fighting the Veltminh and we control only a little less than half of the territory and about one-third of the rural population. Would you say then that this policy that we have been following was notable for its success?

Mr. RUSK. Well, I will ask Secretary McNamara to comment on the military aspects of what you were saying. We do not find that the people in the countryside in South Vietnam look to the liberation front or to Hanoi for leadership. These are villagers who are trying to get on with the day's work. We find that there is no difficulty about their cooperation with the Government or with us in those areas where they can cooperate without having their throats cut by terrorists the following night. Now the villagers there are like villagers everywhere else. They're not perhaps highly motivated politically in any particular direction, but we are quite convinced that they are not reaching out to the liberation front of Hanoi for their answers.

We find that there is no difficulty about their cooperation with the Government or with us in those areas where they can cooperate without having their throats cut by terrorists the following night. Now the villagers there are like villagers everywhere else. They're not perhaps highly motivated politically in any particular direction, but we are quite convinced that they are not reaching out to the liberation front of Hanoi for their answers. Now on the question—Secretary McNamara can comment on the military aspect.

Mr. McNAMARA. Well, first, has our policy been successful? I think you have to look at this over a period of years. I would say the answer is yes. For 10 years, since the

nation was born, or reborn, after the Geneva accords of 1954, it has maintained its independence. It is not dominated-dominated by the Communists and for much of that period prior to the recent expansion of the terror reign directed against it by the guerrillas, it did increase its strength, economically and politically. As you undoubtedly know, between 1954 and 1961, when the terror raids began to increase in number and frequency, the number of teachers in that country increased threefold. The number of students in schools increased 300 percent. The rice production nearly doubled and by the way, that happened at a time when the rice production per capita in North Vietnam was declining. The income per capita is 50 percent more than it is in North Vietnam.

So I'd say much progress has been made, continues to be made. Last year, the Communist guerrillas killed or kidnaped about 1,500 civic officials. Now when you recognize that the population under the control of the Government is less than a 20th of that in this country, you should multiply those figures by 20 to get an impression of what that would mean in this country. It would mean that we would have lost last year, 30,000 mayors, members of boards of education, city managers, and yet despite that tremendous loss and despite a loss of about 10,000 civilians kidnaped, murdered, assassinated, the people are continuing to fight, continuing to resist. They're absorbing fatalities today at a rate greater than we've ever absorbed in our history, twice that of World War I, twice that of World War II, 10 or 15 times that of the Korean war, showing that they are fighting. They do have a will to resist. They are opposed to Communist domination. I think this is the best measure I can give you of the success that follows.

Mr. KALISCHER. Well, would you say, sir, that if they were resisting that their defection rate, or their desertion rate should drop appreciably? I understand now that they're 4,000 to 5,000 a month and that recruitment barely keeps up with it.

Mr. McNAMARA. Recruitment is in excess of desertions, but I don't want to fail to recognize that desertions are at a rate higher than we would like to see, higher than the South Vietnamese Government believes satisfactory and they have acted recently to—to increase the pay, to take care of the families and dependents of men wounded and killed in battle and I understand the desertion rate is falling. It has been higher than we would have liked to have seen, however, but the fact that they can continue to recruit, the fact that they continue to fight and die for their country in the numbers that they do, I think indicates their will to resist, and also I should mention that the desertions are not to the Vietcong. The desertions are back to their home to take care of their ricefields and also on that same point, I should emphasize that the defections from the Vietcong are rising, and further that there has been no desertions of any important personality and no movement to defect of any group; no religious group, no economic group, no labor group has deserted the Government for the Vietcong, although the opportunities for that have been numerous.

Mr. KENDRICK. Sir, let me take this a little bit forward. You started by saying that this was not entirely a military problem and I gather that you felt that it was not even primarily a military problem.

Mr. McNAMARA. It is not primarily a military problem.

Mr. KENDRICK. All right, and from what you've said since about the situation in the villages, the kidnappings, the terroristic activities, obviously it is more than a military problem, but we are now in the process of a gigantic military buildup in Vietnam. Don't military considerations now assume a larger role than ever before? Is it possible that they have taken over from political consider-

ations? Don't they have a logic all their own, which is not always related to policy? Aren't military actions taken usually to support or reinforce previous military actions? In other words, are we now in the maws of a military machine?

Mr. McNAMARA. No; I think not. This problem is primarily a political and economic problem. We will succeed, the Government of South Vietnam will succeed only if it obtains and retains the confidence of its people. It can't retain the confidence of its people unless it appears to be advancing their interests, economically and politically. That is the objective of the Government of South Vietnam. That is our objective. The military operations are necessary, but not a sufficient action to assure achievement of that objective. We must provide physical security in the countryside, otherwise the peasants can't till their fields; the government representatives can't move to carry on elections as they did 60 days ago. The members of the United States Economic Aid Mission who are stationed out in the districts and provinces can't work with the peasants to increase the yield per acre of rice, to add to the pig population, to double the corn production, as it is our objective to do between 1964 and 1966. So that physical security is an absolute requirement for achievement of our economic and political goals, but it is not a substitute for those goals in any sense of the word. We realize that. Every one of our men there realized that.

Mr. RUSK. Secretary, I think it might be worth pointing out, Mr. Reasoner and Mr. Ksndrick, that when we say this, this is not a military problem. This is profoundly true from the point of view of the Vietnamese Government in what we are trying to accomplish. Our economic and social development aid to South Vietnam has been as large as our military aid. But we want to be very careful that we not say that the other side can have a military solution. Now you can't get on with this job in the countryside if the other side puts a man with a rifle in his hand there to stop you. So that the security element is a very important part of the main theme which is to develop that country economically and socially and to pull these people together.

Mr. REASONER. There's an area here that I think affects the confidence in this country in what we are doing. And I think maybe we can dispose of it without trying to pin either of you down on things you've said before. But for instance, as you remember about 18 months ago, when we had a conversation, you said to the effect that this is a Vietnamese war, it must be won by the Vietnamese. We cannot win it for them. The kinds of things that administration leaders say have changed radically in the last 2 years. Is this because you have changed your minds that much, or is there a possibility that you have even now a more advanced attitude, and you're letting the country in on it little by little?

Mr. McNAMARA. Well, let me say first, that the outlook has changed over the past 2 years, because the action of the North Vietnamese has changed during that period of time. They have vastly increased the number of men that they have infiltrated into South Vietnam. They have vastly increased the amount of equipment and material which they have infiltrated into that country. And this has temporarily given them an advantage which they particularly have applied in the form of terror and harrassment.

Today, they have for all practical purposes a numerical advantage not absolutely, but relatively, in guerrilla war terms. They have about 70,000 regular guerrillas; perhaps 100,000 irregulars, and another 20,000 or 30,000 in political cadres to collect taxes, distribute propaganda, and so on. So as Mr. Kalischer mentioned a moment ago, thers are some

200,000 Communists acting in guerrilla forces. Opposing them are about 550,000 South Vietnamese regular and paramilitary forces—the ratio of something on the order of 3 or 3½ to 1, and somewhat less a ratio in the form of combat battalions. Quite an unsatisfactory ratio in terms of guerrilla wars of the past, where in Malaya, in the Philippines, in Greece, a 10-to-1 advantage was required to defeat the guerrillas. This increase in the strength of the North Vietnamese occurred in the last 12 months. It requires that we supplement, not substitute for, but supplement the South Vietnamese forces and since our forces will supplement and not substitute for their forces, it remains a South Vietnamese war. They are bearing the brunt of the fighting. They will continue to bear the brunt of the fighting. We will furnish a mobile reserve to come in to assist them when their forces are inadequate numerically to effectively counteract the Vietcong concentration directed against them.

Mr. KALISCHER. Mr. Secretary, how many of the 200,000 guerrillas are South Vietnamese?

Mr. McNAMARA. I think the bulk of them are. But that is not the important point. The important point is that the leaders, political and military, the cadre men if you will, some 50,000 of them have been sent down from the north, trained in the north, sent down from the north, directed, operated, controlled from the north. And the bulk of the weapons, I would say probably 80 percent of the weapons today, have been supplied by the north. The main force units of the guerrillas were completely re-equipped in the last year—year and half—with 7.62 millimeter rifles, by the north. All the ammunition for that comes from the north. The interrogation of prisoners in recent months shows that North Vietnam, out of Hanoi, is directing the war day by day, hour by hour and I mean that literally, by commands, political and military out of the north.

So while the bulk of the guerrillas are from the south, the control, the direction, the foundation, the effort is from the north, and as a matter of fact, North Vietnam doesn't deny that, and I think it's important to recognize this. It's not a civil war. It is a war of aggression by an outside power seeking to subvert the established political institutions, and they say that. In 1960, Ho Chi Minh issued orders, and this is a matter of record, to step up the revolution in the south and a year or two ago, which is the periodical of the North Vietnamese Communist Party, said that the authorities in South Vietnam are well aware that North Vietnam is the firm base for the revolution in that country, and the point on which it leans. So North Vietnam hasn't made any effort to hide the fact that it is directing the activities in the south. Now I don't mean to say that there are no dissident minorities in the south. There are in all countries evolving as rapidly as that one is, politically and economically. And there are dissident minorities there. But they are minorities which could be properly controlled and properly assimilated into the structure of that nation were it not facing this aggression from the north.

Mr. KALISCHER. Mr. Secretary, pragmatically, granted that it's being—that the revolutionary effort is being directed from North Vietnam, the defense of South Vietnam is being directed by us and supported by us. We are Americans, the North Vietnamese are Vietnamese. In a matter of contesting for the minds and the hearts of the people, wouldn't we, whether we liked it or not, be stuck with the onus of invaders, rather than the North Vietnamese since we are showing ourselves in the countryside, as what we are?

Mr. McNAMARA. First, Mr. Kalischer, let me make clear, the defense of South Vietnam is not being directed by the United States.

The defense of South Vietnam is being directed by the Government of South Vietnam, the forces of South Vietnam operate under the military command of their own leaders. Our soldiers will operate under the command of U.S. officers, but it will be in a supplementary role, and we are not assuming direction of the military program there.

Mr. RUSK. I think we ought to clarify this point about who are the Vietnamese. We resisted the effort of the North Koreans to move in and take over South Korea, although both were Koreans. And I can assure you that the other side would not call it simply an indigenous matter if the Federal Republic were to put tens of thousands of Germans into East Germany to take over East Germany. In other words, there was a basic settlement in 1954 on southeast Asia, and following that, an agreement in 1962 on Laos. Now a very important effort is being made by Hanoi to change those settlements by force. This is a thing that is not acceptable. The infiltration by the north is what causes the presence of American combat troops in South Vietnam. Had this not started, our combat forces would not be there. If this were removed, our forces could come home. We're not there to take on what might be called a purely indigenous problem, within South Vietnam. It is aggression from the outside that causes us to be there.

Mr. KALISCHER. Yes, but can this be explained to the Vietnamese peasants?

Mr. McNAMARA. Let me answer that if I may, by telling you that 10 days ago, 2 weeks ago, when General Wheeler and I were in South Vietnam, we, of course, were very much interested in that point. This was before the President had decided to increase the strength of the military, U.S. military forces assigned to South Vietnam. We asked a number of South Vietnam leaders this exact question. Without a single exception, they asked for additional U.S. forces, and they stated that unless additional forces came, the people of South Vietnam—and by this they meant not only the sophisticated citizens of the city, but the peasants as well—would doubt our determination to stay and our ability to provide the physical security which they require to advance their economic and political welfare.

I was particularly interested in the comment of one of these individuals. Dr. Quat, whom you know was a former Prime Minister, asked to see us and we went to talk to him, and he had just two points to make. One, you must increase the number of U.S. military personnel in South Vietnam. Unless you do, our soldiers cannot continue to fight effectively against the expanded Vietcong guerrilla force. And two, if you do increase your forces, of course, there will be isolated instances of friction between your soldiers and our people, but our people will welcome it, because they know that you have no designs on our nation that conflict with our own interests. They know that when the Vietcong are defeated, you will leave and therefore, they welcome you.

Mr. RUSK. We have thousands of Americans throughout the countryside, both civilian and military, living with the South Vietnamese and in a sense completely at their mercy. Now I think it's important to realize that we have not had reported a single instance of treachery on the part of the South Vietnamese with respect to an American who is living right inside their villages, or right with them in the countryside. Now, this is an important thermometer of political attitudes, it seems to me.

Mr. REASONER. I'd like before we turn to another aspect of this, Secretary McNamara, you've been there. We've made these decisions. We've had a few months of experience with increased U.S. forces. How is it going this year?

Mr. McNAMARA. The Vietcong did expand their force in the last 12 months and as we

stated during the winter of last year, and the spring of this, a major part of this expanded force had not been committed to combat at that time. We could only assume they were holding it for some special purpose or some special period. And we assumed that they might be holding it to start operations on an expanded basis following the beginning of the monsoon season. This is the season of heavy rains in the highlands. It is a season when our air power is somewhat less effective than during the dry period, and we assumed that the Vietcong would believe it was an advantage for them, therefore, to expand operations under those weather conditions.

They did so. They expanded operations in number and intensity, beginning in May and they increased their control of the area. They began to isolate certain particular portions of the villages, isolate them in terms of road transportation, road communications, with other parts of the country. This made it difficult to move rice from the storage centers out into certain of the rural areas. It made it difficult to move produce from the rural areas into the cities. The number of South Vietnamese killed in action increased. But while that is true, the number of Vietcong killed in action increased dramatically. It is about 70 percent higher today than it was a year ago. So in recent weeks, recent months, they have had some success. They are paying a terrible price for it, and in the last 30 days, as a matter of fact, there seems to have been some withdrawal on their part. Whether this is for regrouping, recuperation, because some of their battalions were severely mauled, I don't know. It may be a reflection of the fact that larger U.S. forces are beginning to enter the country.

Mr. KENDRICK. Sir, I would like to pursue that. Now would you give us a view into the future? There are estimates that it might take another \$10 billion a year to carry this on. The military advisers are supposed to have proposed a level of 750,000 men in Vietnam. If there is a failure of bombing of North Vietnam, as there may be, isn't the next logical step ground action into North Vietnam? I wonder if you'd develop these points in the perspective of the months ahead?

Mr. McNAMARA. First, let me say I can't predict the future with accuracy. I do want to mention one thing about the future, however, that I think is very interesting. Within the last 3 or 4 weeks, Ho Chi Minh looked into the future and he said it might take 20 years for them to win.

So while they have had some temporary success, it is obvious even to their own leaders that this is not going to lead to an immediate victory on their side. Let me comment on one or two of the points you made. First, I don't know of any military adviser to our Government who has proposed a level of 750,000 U.S. military personnel in South Vietnam. Secondly, as to the bombing program in the north, I think it is important we understand what we hope to achieve by that program. In the first place, you recall, it started in part as a reprisal action for the terror bombings that had been carried on by the Vietcong last year at Bien Hoa airfield, at Brinks Barracks and more recently in February—early February of this year—at Pleiku. It was necessary to show the North Vietnamese who were directing those activities that this would not go unchallenged; that they would pay a price for the continuation of them. Our bombing started, in part, to make that clear. It was also important to begin to raise the price to the North Vietnamese of carrying on this war. It was important to try to restrict, although certainly it was never considered it would be possible to stop, the movement of men and equipment to the south. And I think these objectives have, in part, been accomplished. We never believed and we don't believe today that bombing in the north will drive the

North Vietnamese to the bargaining table or force them to cease their terror tactics and harassment and subversion of the political institutions of the south. There is only one thing that will stop that in my view and that's to prove to them they can't win in the south. And therefore, our strategy is directed to that end. How long it will take I can't tell.

Mr. KENDRICK. We don't envision them going into the north on the ground?

Mr. McNAMARA. We have made clear time and again, we have limited objectives in the south. I think it is important for our own people to realize that and certainly for the people of the world to realize that. We do not seek to overthrow the Government of North Vietnam. We do not seek permanent military bases in South Vietnam. We do not seek to force the South Vietnamese into an alliance with Western nations. We seek only to insure that they have the right and the opportunity to control their own destiny, to shape their political and economic institutions according to patterns of their own choosing.

Mr. RUSK. Mr. Kendrick, I wonder if I might not add, that it's always easy to turn a lesser war into a big war. This can be done in any 5 minutes. Now, in this post-war period, had we and others not been concerned about the effort of the Communist world to take over a country by force, we well might have seen Iran and Greece, Turkey, Berlin, Korea, the Philippines, southeast Asia, including Malaya—other areas—taken over by force by the Communist world. Now, we and others have had to meet that with firmness and determination. We have taken considerable losses. We alone have taken 160,000 casualties since 1945; others have taken more, but in that process we have tried to keep open the doors to a peaceful settlement. We have tried to avoid the slippery slope down into a general war. In the case of Berlin we used an airlift rather than divisions on the ground in order to try to resolve that by peaceful means. In the case of Korea, with a monopoly of nuclear weapons, we took substantial casualties rather than open up a nuclear war. We waited over 4 years before we bombed North Vietnam in this southeast Asian situation. In other words, it is not a part of our desire to turn these difficult and mean and frustrating issues into general war. That is the easiest thing to think of and the easiest thing to do. The commitment of the American people and the American Government is to a decent world order in which these problems can be resolved by peaceful means.

Mr. KENDRICK. But might not the suspension of bombings of North Vietnam be more conducive to negotiations than the continuation of them?

Mr. RUSK. Well, we did, as you know, suspend the bombing for a period, and long before we resumed the bombing we had the answer from the other side which was very harsh indeed, and there have been public statements recently from the other side indicating that suspension of the bombing is not necessarily the door to a peaceful settlement.

Mr. KENDRICK. Mr. Harriman was in Europe and he talked to Tito, and Tito reflecting the Russians—apparently thought that if we did suspend the bombing it might help.

Mr. RUSK. Well, it might help them, but—

Mr. KENDRICK. No, no; they said it might help bring about talks—

Mr. RUSK. Well, we have asked them; we have asked everybody that we can find to talk to. What else do you think would happen if we stopped the bombing in North Vietnam?

Mr. KENDRICK. Why don't we stop it and find out?

Mr. RUSK. Would the operations in the south stop? Would the infiltration of men

stop? Would they even come to a conference table? In other words, we can't find from the other side the slightest hint as to what would happen if we stopped the bombing.

Mr. KALISCHER. Mr. Kendrick asked why don't we stop and find out.

Mr. KENDRICK. Why don't we stop—

Mr. RUSK. Of course the answer is we did stop. It wasn't long ago—8 or 9 weeks ago.

Mr. KENDRICK. I know you stopped for 4 or 5 days. Even on the Hill people thought that wasn't long enough.

Mr. McNAMARA. It was long enough for North Vietnam to make perfectly clear that they didn't plan to do anything as a result of our stopping other than what they had previously been doing. They wouldn't talk. They wouldn't stop the aggression in the south. They wouldn't agree to talk in the future, so all I can say, we stopped and maybe sometime in the future—

Mr. RUSK. We made it clear in recent days that this question of bombing of North Vietnam has to do with the making of the peace and that we're prepared to consider this if, in fact, it can be a step toward peace but we want to see some indication that this will have that effect and not just the opposite effect.

Mr. KENDRICK. Over the weekend Hanoi announced that the Vietcong had appealed to it for aid and that they were thinking about asking volunteers from the north to go back to the south. This, of course, may be a matter of throwing dust into our eyes, but could it also be a matter of having our assumptions wrong to start with? This is the thing that a great many people are still confused about. The Vietcong, Hanoi—that is, North Vietnam—and the Chinese Communists in the background. Now, Mr. McNamara indicated much more broadly than you did, sir, that our objective in east Asia—in southeast Asia—was more than simply the restoration of a status in South Vietnam. He was talking about overall Communist aggression there as if we were sort of thinking of trying to roll it back. Now I wonder if we are still fighting the same war with Communist China that we were fighting in Korea? Is that really the enemy?

Mr. RUSK. Well, the present enemy on the ground is North Vietnam and the infiltration from North Vietnam as far as we are concerned. This appeal by the liberation front to Hanoi and Hanoi's response to it simply repeats the factual situation. Hanoi has been sending tens of thousands of men and large quantities of arms into South Vietnam. This is not new. Now in terms of the more general problem, as you know there have been very important disputes within the Communist world and specifically between Moscow and Peking, on the question of strategy and tactics in promoting the world revolution. Moscow has been more prudent, more cautious in this respect. Peking has announced a doctrine of militancy which has caused great problems even within the Communist world. Now if Peking should discover that a doctrine of militancy is a successful policy through what happens in southeast Asia, then the dangers throughout the rest of the world mount very quickly and very substantially.

Mr. KENDRICK. We are putting our priority on Vietnam and I was thinking in terms of our relations with the Russians, let us say. You speak of the split in the Communist world, but are we making it impossible, really, for the Russians to cooperate with us even if they might want to? They, at Geneva, for instance, intruded Vietnam before all other questions, and the whole business of disarmament, of nuclear control, of proliferation is just left hanging in air until, they say, we resolve the Vietnam problem by getting out of Vietnam.

Mr. RUSK. Well, Mr. Kendrick, we do want improved relations with the Soviet Union. We should like to find whatever points of agreement we can find in order to build the

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE August 11, 1965

possibilities of a more normal relationship. The test ban treaty raised some hopes that we might be able to find those other points. But we can't have good relations with the Soviet Union at the expense of letting a country like Vietnam be taken over by force. We could have had good relations with the Soviet Union had we pulled out of Berlin in 1948, or had we ignored Korea in 1950. This is not the basis on which safe, good relations can be based.

We've got to get to a point where those who have power will leave the smaller countries alone. I know that there are some who think that China is entitled to a sphere of influence out in its part of the world. Those people don't usually specify which are the great powers that are entitled to a sphere of influence and who are the rest of them that have to accept a sphere of influence. I can't think of a more dangerous development in world affairs than for three or four, or perhaps five great powers to embark upon a great race for influence through spheres of influence because there you would find a race for power that would be almost unmanageable in its violence and in its danger. We've got to establish the point that a small country that is within reach of a great power is nevertheless entitled to live at peace, and to be unmolested by that great power; otherwise, the entire structure of world order comes to pieces and we're back in the law of the jungle.

Mr. KALISCHER. Mr. Secretary, the Russians aside, what is the picture of our effort among—not among our potential enemies, but among our allies?

Mr. RUSK. We have been in touch, of course, with a lot of our friends on this matter. I would make a rough estimate that between 60 and 70 governments support what we are doing in South Vietnam and wish us well. There are more than 30 governments that are providing some sort of assistance, some of it too small, in our judgment, for the effort in South Vietnam. There are about 25 governments that are genuinely indifferent or neutral, and another 25, many of them in the Communist world, that are opposed to what we're trying to do. The underlying fact is that most of the hundred small countries of the world have a stake in the right of a small country to live at peace even though it is within reach of a great power. And I have no doubt that if we could bring this to a successful conclusion, on the basis of throwing back this effort to take over South Vietnam by force, that more than a hundred small countries would clap their hands and say this is a new day in the life of the world.

Mr. KENDRICK. In our efforts, to get a negotiation now, we have asked the United Nations to do what it can. Now why didn't we go the whole way and put the case formally to the United Nations?

Mr. RUSK. We have been in touch with the Secretary General and the members of the United Nations many times on many occasions on that matter. The problem is relatively simple. As you know, the General Assembly has not been functioning in the last year or so because of a very difficult constitutional issue involved in the financial problems of the U.N. The Security Council is the principal agency in which this matter might arise.

In the Security Council nothing could be done except by agreement among the Big Five. There is a veto in the Security Council. Now the question is really whether it is desirable to have a highly acrimonious, eye-gouging kind of debate there, if at the end of the trial there is going to be no action by the Security Council. It would be far better to sound this out quietly behind the scenes, as is going on and has been going on for a long time, to see whether there is some action which the United Nations can take that would help the situation.

Now we could easily, I suppose, meet the views of those who say, oh, take it to the U.N. by putting on one or two demonstrations—let it go there. Let a resolution be vetoed, have the U.N. break up with no capacity to do anything about it, no agreement, and then come away and say well, they've had their fling at it. Well, this is a little irresponsible to deal with it that way. What we would like to do is to find some way in which the United Nations can contribute positively to the solution of the problem of South Vietnam, and not necessarily just to a further inflammation of the issues involved.

Mr. REASONER. Mr. Secretary, getting back to the military situation for a moment, you have said from time to time that the conditions for peace are an end to the aggression, but Ambassador Lodge once suggested that perhaps it might happen in a different way with just on a given day less fighting. Have you got such a major operation mounted now that you would know if this were happening? Can you stop what you've started there?

Mr. McNAMARA. Oh, yes; and I don't think there is any conflict between what I have said is the condition of peace and end of aggression and Ambassador Lodge's statement that on a given day there simply may be fewer instances than the day before and a gradual reduction. That is the way the guerrilla war ended in Greece and it may well end that way in South Vietnam. We're very sensitive to the level of activity. We measure very carefully the effort expended by North Vietnam in supporting the Vietcong, in the manner in which the Vietcong apply that support and effort, and we would be quick to sense any change in policy or objective, or capability, and our effort would drop accordingly. We have stated many, many times we do not seek to assign U.S. military forces permanently in South Vietnam. We have no desire to develop military bases there for our use. We will bring our forces back as promptly as the external aggression ceases.

Mr. REASONER. Do you risk, or do you get into the situation where you make one decision because of the previous one where you have lost control? In other words, you put in 100,000 men because you put in 50,000?

Mr. McNAMARA. No, certainly not. The number of men we have there is a direct function of the level of aggression carried on by North Vietnam. It was necessary for us to put in combat troops only because the North Vietnamese introduced sufficient forces to overpower the antiguerilla forces—those of the Government.

Mr. KENDRICK. Sir, on this question of decisions, aren't they now making themselves, or aren't the Communists making them for us? Really, they are the ones who are deciding what shall be the nature and the stature of the war, so to speak, and we are responding to that. We are putting in more men because of what they do. Therefore, basically, the decision as to what we do in the future is in their hands, isn't it?

Mr. McNAMARA. Certainly what we do in the future will be influenced by what they do. The price they're paying is increasing. At some point it will reach a level they're unwilling to pay. At that point they'll stop and they'll withdraw. How soon that will come, I can't tell you. How much force we must apply before they make that decision, I can't tell you.

Mr. KALISCHER. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned before that Dr. Quat told you it was absolutely necessary now—

Mr. McNAMARA. Yes.

Mr. KALISCHER (continuing). To get more American troops in, otherwise the Government forces could not continue to fight effectively against the increased infiltration from North Vietnam. But you also said earlier in this program that the majority of the Vietcong were South Vietnamese. Now,

what keeps the Vietcong fighting and fighting so effectively with what is a great degree smaller amount of goods and arms and cadres coming in through the Ho Chi Minh trail, and by sea, against Government forces which are reinforced by 125,000 Americans and blank check on arms?

Mr. McNAMARA. Well, a part of it is an ideological motivation, a religion, if you will; they believe in communism. There is no question about that. A part of it is the terror that is imposed upon them by their officers, by their noncommissioned officers, by the acts that have been directed against their villages and their wives and their families.

Mr. KALISCHER. Don't we in a sense, exercise terror also?

Mr. McNAMARA. Not to my knowledge and certainly not in that fashion. I don't think we should close our eyes to the fact; the fact is that in 1964, in the 12 months that ended December 31 of last year, the Vietcong killed or kidnapped 1,500 civic officials in that country and they killed or kidnapped 9,700 other civilians. This is approximately 11,500 civilians killed or kidnapped. Now that's the level of terror that is being directed against that population and despite that level of terror, only 25 percent of the people remain in areas controlled by the Vietcong. About 300,000 refugees have left those areas in recent months. An army, that on our terms, is equivalent to 12 million Americans continues to fight the Vietcong and they are absorbing fatalities as I say, at rates higher than we have ever experienced in our history, so I don't think we should fail to recognize the degree of allegiance, if you will, of the people to not only their Government, but to their own independence—

Mr. KALISCHER. Sir, but suppose—

Mr. McNAMARA (continuing). And the degree of pressures placed on those supporting the Vietcong. There is one group, a minority group, that is ideologically motivated. There is another group that represents the government of Hanoi—politically and militarily. There is a third group—I believe the largest group—which is fighting because they have no physical alternative open to them.

Mr. KENDRICK. Is it possible that a Saigon government—not this one—might in the future negotiate terms with North Vietnam and ask us to leave and if it is possible what would we do?

Mr. RUSK. Well, I think the question there, Mr. Kendrick, turns on Hanoi's attitude toward their own program. In that sense the aggressor always has a certain initiative. It is my impression that Hanoi at the present time is living on three prospects: one, that they can succeed militarily in South Vietnam. Now that is going to be denied to them. So that can be put aside. Secondly, that international opinion somehow will build up in such a way as to cause the United States to change our commitment to South Vietnam. That will not occur. And, third, that internal differences among the American people might cause the United States to change its course. I do not believe that will occur.

We do have in this country a vigorous and thriving and sometimes tumultuous democracy and it is quite right for us to debate actively and vigorously all great issues of public moment. But it is quite true that Hanoi lives on expressions of dissent or disagreement here within our own society. I think the repeated demonstration of unity in this country is very important in persuading Hanoi that they cannot rely upon differences here at home to cause us to pull away from our commitment to South Vietnam.

So, I think on those three, those three elements that seem to sustain the hope of Hanoi, they must come to the awareness that these are unrealistic and that they must, in fact, come sometime to the idea of a peaceful settlement. But, this is the key

thing. We have had dozens upon dozens of contacts in every conceivable form, fashion and forum, in order to find out whether there is any interest on the part of the other side in a peaceful settlement. Those contacts continue. We would know very quickly if they had concluded that they are prepared to bring about peace in Southeast Asia and it is important that those contacts continue open, as I can assure you they are open.

Mr. KALISCHER. Mr. Secretary, what about recently—

Mr. RUSK. The contacts continue quite apart from what we ourselves do, which is considerable, and I can assure you that our diplomacy is not inactive on this matter. The world is filled with volunteers who would be glad to come in and make contacts with both sides, to see if they can find some peace here, so there is no lack of contact.

Mr. REASONER. Has there been any sign at all of interest on the other side?

Mr. RUSK. Well, Secretary McNamara mentioned Ho chi Minh's statement that they are in this if it takes 20 years. My own understanding of that statement is that they know very well they are not going to win this war this year or next year, and I think there are some serious problems on the other side. We, in all of these crises in the postwar period, quite rightly, concentrate upon the problems we have on our side. We sometimes forget about the fact that there are some very serious problems on the other side. Now, in each one of these crises in the past there came a moment where a casual word or a passing comment or a little sign or a little signal opened the door to peace. This happened in Korea. It happened with the Berlin blockade. It's happened in other circumstances. All I can say at the moment is we do not yet feel we have had that crucial sign that peace is open, but we are looking for it and we will continue to look for it while we make it clear that we are not going to be driven out of South Vietnam.

Mr. REASONER. Secretary Rusk, I think Americans sometimes have—while they support this policy—have trouble understanding just what we mean when we speak in the pattern of having to defend it here or we'll have to fight in some less suitable place. To be hypothetical, what would happen if Secretary McNamara announced that we had done all we could and we were now withdrawing because he needed the boys at home and we left? What do you think would ensue?

Mr. RUSK. Well, I think that it would not be for me to answer that one directly. But imagine yourself to be a Thai, and ask what the American commitment to Thailand would mean to you under those circumstances. Think of yourself as a West Berliner and ask yourself what the American commitment to you would mean under those circumstances. At the very heart, gentlemen, of the maintenance of peace in the world is the integrity of the American commitment under our alliances.

Mr. KENDRICK. Is it possible that it's an overcommitment?

Mr. RUSK. Well, that can be argued, but it should have been argued at the time—at the various stages. I personally do not think so, but—because we have made 42 allies, as you know, in this postwar period and at the time it seemed to be in the vital interest of the United States that these alliances be formed.

Now I can tell you that we are not out drumming the bushes for more allies, and we are not necessarily cutting ourselves in on every dispute or problem that arises in any part of the world. We have gone some distance in getting others to take part in problems involving violence to settle them in other forums, and without our direct presence.

For example, the Organization of African Unity has taken hold of some of the problems in Africa and has moved to settle them within an African context. That is first-class from our point of view. So we do not have a worldwide commitment as the gendarme of the universe, but we do have 42 allies, and South Vietnam is a protocol state of the southeast Asia treaty, and it does have a commitment from us. Therefore, the nature of that commitment is fundamental here if we're to maintain peace in the years ahead.

Mr. REASONER. Are we overcommitted from your standpoint, Mr. Secretary? Can you handle everything you foresee?

Mr. McNAMARA. I believe so. The military forces of this country have been built up in strength, as you know. We do have 45 percent more combat ready divisions today than when we did 3 or 4 years ago. We do have nearly 50 percent more tactical fighter squadrons today than we did then. We have been building up our inventories of men and equipment. I think the question is really more fundamental than are we overcommitted. The question is what kind of a world will we and our children live in if we failed to carry out the commitments we have or sought to reduce them.

Mr. REASONER. Can I guess what would be a good final question? You spoke about Ho Chi Minh's 20-year war and you referred to it. Can the Americans stand a 5-year war, or 10-year war, or 20-year war? Can we stick it out?

Mr. KENDRICK. More in terms of stamina and stomach, let's say, than in terms of materiel?

Mr. McNAMARA. Well, I think I should ask you perhaps. I can answer yes without any qualification. I speak for 2 1/4 million of them who are in the Armed Forces today who I can guarantee can stand it, and I think the 180 million that stand behind them can stand it, but I don't think we should fail to recognize what it is that lies ahead. The road ahead will be long. It will be tortuous. It will be frustrating. And if we're to travel that safely—and I underline the word "safely"—and if we're to travel it successfully, we will require courage and we will require imagination, and we will require patience. And perhaps that's what you meant by stamina. Without it we shouldn't start the road. We certainly wouldn't be able to continue it.

Mr. RUSK. I can't escape the recollection, Mr. Kendrick, that I was a student in college when Manchuria was invaded in 1931 and I lived through those periods before World War II when the forces of democracy were not able to organize the defenses of democracy. And that led the men of my generation—your generation—into World War II. We could not find the answer to the problem of tempting thieves. Now, in this postwar period we have encountered a number of threats. The free world with U.S. leadership has moved to meet those threats. We have had a remarkable success in fending them off without a general war. I am deeply convinced myself that the American people have thought long and hard about the kind of world in which we want to live and that when they know that something has to be done, and that all of the alternatives are being and have been fully explored to find out if peace is possible that we need not worry about the stamina and the determination of the American people. It has been proved too often—too often—and the very life of the Nation depends upon it.

Mr. REASONER. Gentlemen, I would like to thank you very much for coming here. I assume there will remain in the United States some difference of opinion on your policies but I am sure that this part of your job, to come and talk to the American people you have done very well and we thank you.

Tonight we have examined the military and political decisions involved in the U.S. policies in Vietnam. Next week at this time in the second of our four-part series on "Vietnam Perspective," we will examine the problems in securing a military victory in South Vietnam. Our guests will be Gen. Maxwell Taylor, the former Ambassador to South Vietnam, and Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Thank you and good night.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. PROXMIRE. I yield.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I am delighted that the Senator has obtained the transcript of the broadcast and has placed it in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. I fully endorse his statement on the particular program to which he has made reference.

It might be well to note that there will be two subsequent programs along the same line, with different personages involved. One will be on next Monday, the 16th of August, and the next one on the following Monday, the 23d of August.

Persons who are interested may wish to watch these two programs, also, to get a complete discussion of the whole program.

I believe the Senator has performed a real service in calling attention to this subject.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Alabama. CBS deserves great credit for bringing this program to the Nation at a time—10 o'clock in this section of the country, 9 o'clock in the Midwest, and so on through the Nation—so that everyone might have an opportunity to hear the ablest and most competent and authoritative spokesmen speak out on this important subject.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I share the feeling the Senator has expressed, that Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara are most able and best prepared to speak on this particular subject and to discuss it with the American people. They are to be commended and congratulated on the clarity with which they presented the program at that time.

I wonder, while I am having this colloquy with the Senator, if I might not ask the Senator if he believes, as I do, first of all, that under our constitutional form of government the primary responsibility for our international relations is the responsibility of the President of the United States?

Mr. PROXMIRE. I do, indeed.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Does the Senator not also believe that the President is surrounded by a group of able advisers in this field?

Mr. PROXMIRE. Yes. I was most impressed on Monday afternoon when we went to the White House—I am sure the Senator was there.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I was there.

Mr. PROXMIRE. At that meeting I was greatly impressed and heartened by the lineup which the President had there. Present were not only Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara, but also other very capable people, like Ambassador Goldberg and Ambassador Lodge and Mr. Black.

Mr. SPARKMAN. That is Eugene Black?

Mr. PROXMIRE. Yes; Eugene Black.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Who is seeking to organize the Southeast Asia Development Co., or whatever the name of the organization is.

Mr. PROXMIRE. He is trying to organize economic development over there.

Mr. SPARKMAN. And Ambassador Goldberg.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Yes; Ambassador Goldberg also, whom I mentioned.

Mr. SPARKMAN. And Ambassador Harriman.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Yes. I neglected to mention Ambassador Harriman.

Mr. SPARKMAN. And Ambassador Taylor.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Also Ambassador Taylor. Of course, he has concluded his services. Nevertheless, he will be on hand to advise and consult with the President and the State Department and the Defense Department. Also present were such able persons as McGeorge Bundy, and others, who are working on this problem.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Does not the Senator feel that Ambassador Taylor gave us a very fine, objective report, balancing the pluses against the minuses quite well?

Mr. PROXMIRE. I thought that was one of the most extraordinary parts of the meeting. It started with an exposition by Ambassador Taylor, which, as the Senator has said, was balanced and objective. He made no attempt to make us believe that our task will be easy, or that we are ahead or winning. He indicated that there were some serious minuses involved, as well as some strengths. I believe his analysis was most informative and helpful to a clear understanding of what we have to do.

While I believe that some, like Speaker McCormack, carried away an optimistic feeling, I believe the reason he did so, and the reason why many of us did so, was not that the situation there was easy, but because of our feeling that our leaders had a realistic and thorough understanding of all the problems, and the resolution to meet them.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, I do not wish to leave this subject without also referring to the very fine and clear statement that was made by Ambassador Harriman, who has had longer service in that field, I suppose, than any of the others.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Yes, indeed. Mr. Harriman served under four Presidents over many years. He is a man of great ability, and a man who has recently returned from a most important discussion with several crucial people in Europe and elsewhere. I thought his report was very helpful.

I thank the Senator.

PATIENCE, COMPÉTENCE MAKE RUSK GREAT SECRETARY OF STATE

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, with tensions mounting throughout the world, the Secretary of State—as the

foreign policy spokesman of the most powerful Nation of the Western World—must work under the burden of constant stress. The decisions which he must make are difficult and often unpopular. Therefore, the office of the Secretary of State has long been a frequent target of criticism. However, the man who holds this position of tremendous responsibility must be able to maintain restraint and dignity no matter how sharp the darts of critics may be.

Secretary of State Dean Rusk must be commended for the tact and wise reserve with which he has handled the recent attacks made upon him by thoughtless domestic critics. In the way he met these irresponsible personal criticisms, Mr. Rusk has again manifested his recognition of the tremendous responsibilities of his office and the selfless dedication to duty which have characterized his entire career.

His policy of firmness and decisive action—even in the face of foreign and domestic criticism—has blunted determined Communist expansion in Berlin, Africa, Latin America, and the Far East.

Mr. Rusk's integrity and quiet strength have gained him the highest respect and confidence of his counterparts throughout the world, a respect which can only be surpassed by that which his colleagues in government and the American people have for him. The steadiness of his hand at all times and his skill at quiet diplomacy—unspectacular but most effective—have served the interests of our Nation well.

I ask unanimous consent that an editorial entitled "Secretary Rusk" from the Baltimore Sun of August 4, 1965, which calls attention to Mr. Rusk's competence and poise even when subjected to irresponsible criticism, be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Baltimore (Md.) Sun,
Aug. 4, 1965]

SECRETARY RUSK

Dean Rusk is not a mysterious figure, but he is a man of marked reserve, and the public has never felt it knew him well. It has learned a bit more about him, perhaps, after his press conference on Monday.

As had been expected, Mr. Rusk was asked about the published statements of Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., historian and once an assistant to President Kennedy, to the effect that Mr. Kennedy had "reluctantly" decided to get another Secretary of State, and that he found the Department of State "formless and impenetrable."

As to the first, Mr. Rusk made it plain that his own memoirs would not be published until the presidential papers of the period become available—until, that is, no damage could be done to the then-current workings of the country's affairs. In any case, he said, such issues as that raised by Mr. Schlesinger would have to be left to future historians, examining "with a compound eye * * * of many facets" the whole and various records of these times.

To this fine historical figure of speech Mr. Rusk added quite tartly, and most pertinently to the present, that his associates in Government and his "colleagues abroad can rest on the assurance that when they deal with me on the basis of confidence that confidence will be respected."

One further quotation:

"It is the purpose of the Department of State to bring about what some people will call a boring situation—that is, a period of peace. * * * Now there are times when some wish us to act with more drama, but there are problems about dramatizing issues if drama gets in the way of settlement. * * * There are times to move and times to delay. The art of the business is deciding when to move and when to delay."

These remarks, we believe, reveal something of the balance, steadiness, and sharp intelligence that caused Mr. Kennedy to choose Mr. Rusk as Secretary of State in the first place, and Mr. Johnson to keep him and rely on him.

TRIBUTE TO SENATOR BREWSTER

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, one of the finest organizations in the United States is the Disabled American Veterans. It is composed of men who have fought valiantly—and at great personal cost—for their country.

Last week, the State of Louisiana was proud to be host to the annual convention of the Disabled American Veterans in New Orleans.

The chief address at the convention was given by an outstanding member of the DAV, the senior Senator from Maryland, [Mr. BREWSTER]. Senator BREWSTER earned his membership in the Pacific in World War II. He was the youngest commissioned officer in the entire Marine Corps in the earlier days of World War II. He commanded a company in battle before he was 21; he was wounded some seven times in four different engagements; he received the Purple Heart, the Gold Star in lieu of a second Purple Heart, and the Bronze Star. Here in the Senate, my colleague has been a consistent advocate of legislation benefiting the disabled veteran.

His remarks on veterans' legislation and on America's position in world affairs, I feel, are worthy of the attention of my colleagues here in the Senate.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator BREWSTER's speech to the convention be printed under morning hour business in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

My friends and fellow delegates, it is a great honor for me to address you here tonight. Two years in the Marine Corps in the South Pacific, and the wounds I received there have earned me the privilege of membership in this great veterans organization.

I am proud of the DAV and proud to be a member. As a United States Senator, I must face the electorate repeatedly. As a life member of the DAV, my future is secure.

I arrived here today to enjoy and help celebrate our national convention. Already I am much in your debt for the privilege, the experience, and the good times.

Your national commander, William G. Dwyer; your national senior vice commander, Claude Callegari from Chapter 16 in Baltimore; and the many others responsible for this affair deserve the deepest and warmest thanks from us all.

We have much to celebrate. DAV membership has grown by 9,000 during the past year. Our financial strength and the organizational skill of national adjutant, Denvel Adams, have permitted the construction of

August 11, 1965

Approved For Release 2003/10/14 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300130015-9

19357

Wyoming, Pennsylvania, and the State of Washington, with branch offices in Kansas City, Mo., and Moorehead, Minn.

The fact that electrified farms were able to substantially step up production for the war effort undoubtedly played a part for victory in World War II, as well as today's food-for-peace plans.

When Harvey Schermerhorn retires at age 65 he will have more than memories to live with.

"I've had six job offers so far," Schermerhorn says, "but I haven't officially decided which to take."

Should he decide to take none—spend the rest of his life relaxing, the Schermerhorn voice in public relations would not be retired.

Both his sons have followed their distinguished father's footsteps: John is a well-known local television personality. Richard Schermerhorn is in public relations at Credit Union National Association (CUNA).

See also Talmadge
**IMPACT OF VIETNAM SITUATION
ON BUSINESS AND FINANCIAL
COMMUNITY**

Mr. TALMADGE. Mr. President, Eliot Janeway, the influential New York economist and nationally syndicated financial columnist, has been an acute and accurate observer of economic and political events for many years. In his column, "Point of View—Janeway," published in the Chicago Tribune of August 5, Mr. Janeway has added a new dimension to our understanding of the impact of the Vietnam situation—its impact upon the business and financial community as measured by its impact upon the New York stock market. Mr. Janeway reports that my distinguished colleague, the Senator from Indiana [Mr. HARTKE], wisely recognizing the significance of the Wall Street barometer "went so far as to tell a select group of New York investment people that the stock market has taken over from the opinion poll and the pollsters as the most reliable and sensitive indicator of changes in public psychology."

As Mr. Janeway continues:

There's no doubt that the stock market has become subject to Vietnam drag.

The fact that the stock market has not been responding to the continued, unprecedented economic expansion which our Nation has been enjoying is cause enough for concern. The fact that this failure is attributable to the troubling situation in Vietnam makes even more clear the magnitude of the impact which this war is having in every area of American life.

I ask unanimous consent that the Chicago Tribune article, "Main, Wall Streets Sharing Viet Worry," by Eliot Janeway, be printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Chicago Tribune, Aug. 5, 1965]

**POINT OF VIEW—JANEWAY—MAIN, WALL
STREETS SHARING VIET WORRY**

(By Eliot Janeway, Consulting Economist)

NEW YORK, August 4.—Politically, Vietnam is now the big issue. Intellectually and morally as well, the question of what to do and what not to do about Vietnam domi-

nates debate—and not only within the United States.

It's news, too, that the stock market is just as scared of Vietnam as the politicians are. In fact, Indiana's Senator VANCE HARTKE went so far as to tell a select group of New York investment people last week that the stock market has taken over from the opinion polls and the pollsters as the most reliable and sensitive indicator of changes in public psychology.

There's no doubt that the stock market has become subject to a Vietnam drag. Its action certainly suggests that Main Street and Wall Street are for once worrying about the same risks and at the same time.

Normally, when times are good, the prevailing political attitude is to coast along on the assumption that the "ins" are safe because nobody ever wants to shoot Santa Claus. Not so in today's tense and tricky new atmosphere of crisis. Times have never been better; and they're certain to stay very good. Nevertheless, every politician in office who has ever survived a political storm, from Johnson on down, is running scared of Vietnam backlash. Candidates preparing for 1966 are thinking more about mothers and first voters than about purse strings.

PUT FIRST THINGS FIRST

The stock market is saying that politicians, who are in this frame of mind are putting first things first. It's no exaggeration to say that, if each and every one of the money worries that have been bothering the stock market were to be settled quickly and to the satisfaction of the investment community, the Vietnam drag would still hold it back.

The same goes for Wall Street's obvious fears on the steel-labor front. Not so long ago, a live-and-let-live settlement, without a strike, without the flashing of brass knuckles from Washington and with operations at a high level, would have been enough to send the stock market into a new upsurge. But that was before the Vietnam drag deflated the bullish arithmetic of earnings and dividends.

Every economic factor which the stock market can count adds up to an argument for bullishness. But the Vietnam risks which no one can count are jamming the computers—appropriately so. For Vietnam is a riddle. In fact, it's a jungle. As in every jungle, sophisticated computers are excess baggage there, and primitive feel is at a premium.

QUALITY OF GENIUS

This is the very quality which gives Johnson his distinctive political genius. But, instead of relying on it in Vietnam, he has allowed Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to take over as playmaker plenipotentiary. And Secretary McNamara is "Mr. Computer."

President Johnson, despite everything that has been said about his vanity on the trivial side and about his instinct for power on the serious side, is not a confident or secure man—denizens of the judge know better. Johnson lacks the sense of security which shallower extroverts like Truman and Eisenhower had.

It is in character for Johnson to defer to an aggressive claimant for authority like McNamara. But the stock market is putting the President on notice that he may have sold himself short in his all-out gamble on McNamara.

MOVES WITH TIDES

Senator HARTKE may be right in advising us to use the stock market for sense-making as well as money-making. Since Korea it has moved with the political tides, belying its historical reputation for being out of step with majority opinion. In fact, Wall Street has rated our President about the way

Congress has. First with Eisenhower and then, with Kennedy, a honeymoon confidence boom foundered and ran out of steam. As the President settles down to the post-election task of governing in his own right, the stock market is asking the same question as Congress: Will his confidence boom go the way of Eisenhower's and of Kennedy's?

If Johnson had let a "Martin market" develop on the money front, it's clear that the bears would have had a field day. And now the wary action of the stock market is serving notice that, if he lets a "McNamara market" materialize, the bullish contingent will even panic before the bear grows at them.

REPRESENTATIVE KING'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE VOICE OF AMERICA PROGRAM

Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, 6 years ago, when my distinguished Utah colleague, Representative DAVID S. KING, was in his first year in the other body, the Voice of American made the discovery that he was fluent in French. VOA asked Congressman KING if he would be willing to make his talent available for broadcast work, and the Congressman graciously consented to help. For 6 years now, he has been making a generous and rather regular contribution to the Nation's international communications work, through this work.

In his first 4 years in Congress, the gentleman from Utah appeared occasionally in Voice of America news programs on French-language stations, offering timely commentary on the activities in Congress and Washington. In the 2 years he was not serving in his House seat, Congressman KING accepted a Voice of America request to prepare a major broadcast series on the American Constitution. The series of 13 broadcasts, on which the gentleman from Utah spent more than 600 hours in research and writing, commemorated the 175th anniversary of the ratification of our inspired Constitution. Hundreds of millions of listeners, in countless lands, have heard Congressman KING speak for his country, in both French and English.

He is now playing the key role in another major series on Voice of America. The series is an intimate glimpse of the Member of Congress at work on Capitol Hill. This series, entitled "A Congressman's Diary," is the subject of a featured article in Voice of America's latest program schedule for Europe. I proudly commend my Utah colleague on the splendid contribution he is making to the cause of freedom through his Voice of America work, and I invite the attention of the Congress and the Nation to the article from VOA's August-October schedule for Europe.

I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

CONGRESSMAN'S DIARY

Unusual jobs are not difficult to find in Washington, but there are 535 men and women who occupy a special niche. They work long hours, often from early in the

19358

morning to late at night. One hundred of these men and women are Senators. Four hundred and thirty-five are Congressmen. They represent over 190 million Americans in the legislative branch of the U.S. Government. One of these Congressman—David S. KING from the western State of Utah—is the subject of a biweekly Voice of America program. Other Members of Congress will appear on the program from time to time.

Each year the Voice of America receives letters from its listeners all over the world who are curious about the duties of a Congressman. They want to know how and why he votes on specific legislation, whether he is bound to the policy of his political party, how he keeps in contact with his constituents who may live thousands of miles from his Washington office. These and other questions are being answered by "A Congressman's Diary," a series of programs based on the actual experiences and intimate observations of DAVID KING.

Mr. KING is now beginning his third term as a Congressman. He was first elected in 1958 by the people living in and near Salt Lake City, Utah. His congressional district consists of over 400,000 people. In 1960 they reelected Mr. KING, but 2 years later he was not returned to office. However, last November, Mr. KING, a Democrat, received a majority of the votes and once again was given the responsibility of representing his district in Washington.

Letters are one of the primary means of communication between a Congressman and his constituents at home. Mr. KING reports that when important legislation is being considered by the Congress, he is likely to receive as many as 600 letters a day. People write to suggest new legislation, to argue with the Congressman's point of view, to commend him on action he has taken, to ask for his help in dealing with other branches of the Government—even to recommend hotels in Washington when they visit the city.

Reading and replying to such letters occupies a considerable amount of Congressman KING's time. That, along with his other duties such as working on specialized congressional committees, leaves him little time for other matters. Concluding the first program in the "Congressman's Diary" series, Mr. KING observed: "By nightfall, the Congressman might try do some last-minute work, but he sees then that he has just time to rush and catch the train that will enable him to get home in time for supper. And I might add that frequently he never gets home for supper. He gets home much, much later and even into the early hours of the morning. So, I can only say that my sincerest regret is that there are only 24 hours in a day in which I can do the work that is assigned to me as a Congressman."

IN DEFENSE OF A FEDERAL SYSTEM OF WORLD GOVERNMENT

Mr. TYDINGS. Mr. President, the only total victory mankind can look forward to is the total victory of peace.

Each passing day makes this clearer and clearer. The utopian beginnings of the Federal Union we call the United States of America has ever inspired mankind in the hope that a world under law can be founded on that premise of federalism.

The United World Federalists of America have been working toward the noble goal of world peace through world law. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the test ban treaty, and many other ideas of merit have come from their thoughtful and quiet leadership.

On May 5 I had the pleasure of presenting to this Congress, Federalist Paper No. 1 by accredited U.N. Observer Marion McVitty, on a permanent U.N. peace force. Today I am happy to present to you Federalist Paper No. 2, "In Defense of a Federal System of World Government" by Hyman Weber, a New York attorney.

While there may be parts of this paper that some of us in this Congress may not agree with, it is vital to our existence that we grapple with these thoughts.

I, for one, am intrigued by the idea that just as the Communists export their political ideology, this Nation may export its ideology of federalism. The concept of federalism has been and remains a dynamic, vital political philosophy which has enabled this Nation to grow. With these thoughts in mind, I ask unanimous consent to insert at this point in the RECORD, Mr. Weber's thoughtful paper.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

IN DEFENSE OF A FEDERAL SYSTEM OF WORLD GOVERNMENT

(By Hyman Weber)

Shortly after World War II, United World Federalists proclaimed that a lasting peace could be secured only by strengthening the United Nations through a revision of its charter and by instituting a Federal form of world government. UWF also holds that with the advent of nuclear power the reservation by individual nations of the right to maintain arms and to wage war has become an intolerable form of international anarchy which threatens all human survival. Despite the fact that the world has twice gone to the brink of nuclear war in recent years, many influential voices are still heard calling for peace through national strength and for an unconditional cold war victory. It would be useful in these circumstances to reemphasize the validity of UWF's position by a careful examination of the arguments that are used against UWF's internationalist view.

PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH

There are those, who, while invariably viewing themselves as prophets of realism, proclaim that peace can be secured only through strength. Their conception of what that strength should be indicates that they are the dreamers, wishful thinkers who believe that stone age diplomacy can insure survival in a nuclear age. Peace does require strength but not the strength of individual nations. It requires the strength of a world government so organized that no one nation will have the power or the right to dictate the conditions under which the world will be permitted to remain at peace. Past wars, it should be stressed, did not occur, because some nations were unable or unwilling to meet the threat of aggression. They occurred because all nations were permitted to retain the means and the right to wage war.

General rearmament and the formation of military alliances can only lead to self-defeating retaliatory responses by opposing nations. Arms races sap the vitality of both sides without materially affecting the relative strength of either. In today's cold war, NATO, the Western military alliance, is matched by the Communist Warsaw Pact Alliance. The nuclear stockpiles of the United States and the Soviet Union have only achieved a nuclear stalemate of mutual deterrence—a balance of terror that can insure peace and survival only in the absence of accident, miscalculation, or the reckless act of a third party.

NEGOTIATING FROM STRENGTH

The concept of negotiating from strength seems compelling at first blush—no nation would be likely to settle or compromise an outstanding issue with a weaker opponent. When one nation rearms, however, the inevitable arms race that ensues, while it may create a delicate and precarious balance of power, will serve mainly to intensify the hostile attitudes between the contending powers. Should such powers then seek to negotiate their differences, they will too often attempt to apply the leverage of their strength in a futile effort to wrest concessions that their opponents are not likely to concede.

As a matter of fact, it is worth reexamining the general proposition that there can be meaningful bilateral negotiations between nations with conflicting economic needs and political aspirations. In their negotiations, disputing nations may profess a desire for peace, but this is eclipsed by the ideological preconceptions, conditions, and pressures each brings to the conference table, and by the reluctance each has to appear to seek compromise in the face of the opponent's strength. Negotiations between disputing nations would be more promising if conducted between those nations and an international agency competent to settle or adjudicate the issue and empowered to enforce its decision. The American nuclear buildup should accordingly not be viewed as a means of insuring fruitful negotiations with the Soviet Union. It can be morally justified only as a means of deterring Soviet aggression and as an instrument for persuading our adversaries to join us in the creation of adequate international machinery for the settlement of our differences.

Many proponents of peace through strength buttress their position by pointing out that previous efforts at disarmament have failed. Their contention is correct, but their conclusion is incorrect. Arrangements after World War I for disarmament or reductions in arms did indeed fail, but only because no international agency was given the power to enforce them. Like all bilateral agreements they were honored only as long as they served the purposes of the signatory powers. Similarly, the interminable disarmament negotiations at Geneva since World War II have failed to achieve any tangible or meaningful results. They will continue to fail as long as the problem of disarmament is approached apart from the overall problem of establishing a viable form of world government, and as long as the major contending powers see no inconsistency in negotiating for disarmament while intent on maintaining a delicate balance of military power and on seeking to gain political and strategic advantages in the continuing cold war struggle.

THE COLD WAR

Efforts to create public support for world government have been most seriously hampered by an insidious cold war psychosis. For the past 18 years the American people have been subjected to a massive campaign, mounted by the communications media, civic and veterans groups and government officials, that has convinced them that world peace can be achieved only through a cold war victory. World peace and a cold war victory, however, are inconsistent and mutually exclusive goals. To hold otherwise is to imply that the cold war can be won without actually going to war. This, of course, is nonsense. It is imperative that both major cold war antagonists reject, once and for all, as the most dangerous kind of wishful thinking, the idea that their opponent will conveniently permit himself to suffer an economic or political collapse, or that he can be talked into voluntary surrender at the conference table, or that he can be intimidated into abandoning his hated ideology by a threatened nuclear attack.

August 11, 1965

these people in preparing them for self-government and economic independence. If they ever bring up the subject again, we will ask: Do you object to giving these people first-class citizenship?

Question. Would this annexation be of any benefit to Hawaii?

Answer. I think this would be good for Hawaii. It would broaden our horizon. Ethnically, the people of these islands are related closely to our own people—Polynesians and Micronesians. We have always talked brotherhood and giving our neighbor a helping hand. Here's our chance to do something to make all of these islands a series of stepping stones between East and West.

Question. What would be the prospect for similar annexation of Guam, American Samoa and other Pacific island possessions of the United States?

Answer. My first step here is to work on the trust territory. Guam, with its own legislature now, may want to consider this matter later. I can understand their immediate reaction to shy away from the proposition. Samoa, with its communal land system, would need further study. This question of land tenure also is a problem in the trust territory. I hope we may work out a scheme whereby the lands could not be taken away from those occupying them.

Question. Isn't this going to take a long time?

Answer. We understand that this will take years to consummate. With 96 inhabited islands in the trust territory, it is likely that some will want to come in and some may not. But some day, we have to start looking into this problem. And that's what I'm proposing that we do now.

Joe Church
PEACEMAKING IN VIETNAM

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, one of Washington's youngest nationally known correspondents is Joseph Kraft. His column, "Insight and Outlook," is appropriately titled, for Joseph Kraft possesses both the "insight" of a scholar and the "outlook" of a newsman. His education includes training in modern history at Columbia and the Sorbonne, and Princeton's Institute for Advanced Studies. Articles under Joseph Kraft's byline have appeared in national magazines and newspapers such as Look, the New Republic, and the London Observer, and he has served as Washington correspondent and public affairs columnist for Harper's.

I believe his August 2 column entitled "Peacemaking in Vietnam" is a thoughtful analysis of the negotiated approach to peace in southeast Asia which I have repeatedly advocated. I ask unanimous consent to have this column, which appeared in the Washington Post, printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, Aug. 2, 1965]

INSIGHT AND OUTLOOK: PEACEMAKING IN VIETNAM

(By Joseph Kraft)

One of the most pernicious official myths floating around Washington is the notion that if the other side was ready to come to terms in Vietnam peace could be arranged in a jiffy.

Actually peace in Vietnam can probably come only at the end of a long, slow, tortuous and highly uncertain process of negotiation. And the chief charge that can be leveled against American diplomacy to date is that

it has not given enough free play to any of the uncertain chains of events that might lead to agreement.

To understand why it is going to be so hard for the other side to make peace, it is enough to see the travail the President of the United States has to go through when he wants to talk about peace. He has to contend with allied governments, with a political opposition, with entrenched officials in his own administration and with a military and diplomacy bureaucracy. Many of these, for one reason or another are committed to war.

Turning this mighty established around is not only a formidable job; it is a job that has to be done behind closed doors through sly hints delivered in whispers by almost invisible men moving on tiptoe in sneakers. For if the secret becomes known prematurely, the President is exposed to murderous charges that he is selling the pass to the enemy.

The same pattern applies on the other side, only much more so. The Peiping government, resolutely opposed to any negotiation, is prepared to denounce those who would promote peace in Vietnam as imperialist stooges betraying the revolution. The three parties that together with Peiping make up the other side in Vietnam are, because they are themselves divided, extremely sensitive to the Chinese charges.

The Russians, for instance, plainly have little stomach for the Vietnamese war. Pravda did not even announce it when the Soviet missiles knocked down American planes. But because of the leadership struggle in Moscow, no one is strong enough to disengage from the Asian commitment. If anything, the missile incident seems to have been timed to take away some of the play from the Chinese at a moment when Communist leaders from all over the world were foregathering at the Rumanian Party Congress in Bucharest.

The North Vietnamese Government in Hanoi also seems to have some partisans of negotiated agreement. When President Ho Chi Minh talks of fighting for 20 years that does not exactly mean he expects victory tomorrow. But he must move cautiously for there are important figures in his government who have ties to Peiping, and who argue that a military victory can be won easily.

Similarly, with the Vietcong rebels in South Vietnam, the fighting men on the ground, like all guerrilla forces, think they are on the verge of victory. They are highly suspicious that deals may be made behind their backs by their political leaders. For that reason, the political arm, or liberation front, of the Vietcong, while not nearly so confident of complete victory, also has to move with care.

The obvious approach to this dicey business is to draw the Vietcong into talks of some kind. Once the fighters on the ground are engaged, moderate forces in Hanoi and Moscow can assert themselves without being exposed to the charge of having sold out the revolution. At that point Communist China either has to go along or be left out.

Engaging the Vietcong, of course, is not easy. The position of the Chinese and their grip on the other parties in the Communist camp rules out a direct approach. Neither is anything apt to come from groups so distasteful to the Chinese as the United Nations or the Indians; nor from such markedly pro-American figures as British politicians or Canadian diplomats.

On the contrary, the initial engagement will probably have to be arranged on some almost irrelevant pretext. The first intermediaries will most likely be unknown figures, mistrusted by both sides. And one of the really interesting questions is whether President Johnson, so accustomed as a builder of consensus to manipulate other men's commitments, can now relax to the point

of allowing other men to manipulate his commitments.

If nothing else, precedent, that angel of Anglo-Saxon progress favors a relaxed approach. People tend to think that the Vietnamese peace of 1954 was arranged at the Geneva Conference. They forget what opened the door to Geneva. It was a cryptic clause in an obscure interview given by Ho Chi Minh to—of all irrelevant things—a Swedish newspaper.

A MENACING POWER PLAY

Mrs. NEUBERGER. Mr. President, an editorial in the Washington Post this week discloses a serious attack upon the regulatory protections to America's electric consumers. An effort is being made by some electric utilities with the support of some State regulatory officials to bring an end to the Federal Power Commission's program of wholesale rate regulation which benefits hundreds of small, independently managed electric distribution systems throughout the country. The Post says, and I quote: "If the lobby of State regulatory officials and private power companies is successful, the Senate will enact a measure that would for all practical purposes end the control which the Federal Power Commission now exercises over electric power rates."

This proposal, which the electric utilities wish to tack on to another bill dealing with rural electric cooperatives which are subject to effective regulation by the REA Administrator, was considered and rejected by the Senate Commerce Committee. It is not in the public interest. As the Post concludes, passage of such exemptions for the electric utilities "would utterly destroy the Federal regulation of electrical rates and revive an era of abuse that was ended with the passage of the Wheeler-Rayburn Act in 1935."

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to the inclusion of the Washington Post editorial of August 10, 1965, at the conclusion of these remarks.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

A MENACING POWER PLAY

If the lobby of State regulatory officials and private power companies is successful, the Senate will enact a measure that would for all practical purposes end the control which the Federal Power Commission now exercises over electric power rates. And without effective rate regulation by the FPC, there will be a sharp increase in the \$14 billion electric bill that is now paid by the Nation's households, business enterprises, Government agencies and nonprofit institutions.

Sponsored by Senators HOLLAND and SMATHERS, the lobby's bill consists of two provisions, both embodied in single sentences of inordinate length. First, the bill states that a utility which is not "directly connected" with an interstate power network is to be exempt from the regulations of the FPC "as a matter of local concern." A second provision repeals the FPC's jurisdiction over wholesale transactions, sales of electrical power from one utility to another when the utility making the sale has "substantial" retail revenues in the State in which the sale is made.

If there is any logical or functional justification for the provisions of the Holland-Smathers bill, it is elusive. Under the first provision, a giant utility which generates

August 11, 1965

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

shack that has no indoor bathing facilities. He frequently bathed in a farm pond. Sunday he moved into West Point—into another rundown area.

Some white residents here said they had noticed that Reuss stood out from other civil rights workers because of his good grooming and good manners.

White townspeople have been critical of the fact some of the men and women civil rights workers live unchaperoned in the same houses.

Reuss said they had separate rooms, but that the organization could not afford separate quarters.

"The local residents won't approve of anything we do anyway," he added.

SON OF REUSS DISAVOWS ANY DESIRE FOR HEROICS

(By Michael Lerner)

What kind of a person is the Congressman's son who decided to continue his work in a Mississippi town, despite shotgun blasts aimed at coworkers and his own harrowing arrest on a false manslaughter charge?

Michael Reuss, 18, is a clean-cut, well-shaven, levelheaded boy with no desire to engage in heroics. All he wants to do is continue his work as a teacher in a rural freedom school outside West Point, Miss., until he returns as a sophomore to Stanford University in September.

The son of Congressman HENRY S. REUSS, Democrat, of Wisconsin, he has had his share of the brushes with southern law-enforcement officers that are part of most civil rights workers' experience.

He spent 8 days in jail in Jackson, Miss., before he arrived in West Point. He had been arrested with other demonstrators on charges of breach of the peace and resisting arrest.

His second spell in jail followed the incident Friday, when he was arrested during a march protesting the previous arrest of 53 Negro schoolchildren.

Reuss does not find any glory in his arrests. And the 157-pound former prep-school wrestler does not enjoy the punches—one behind the left ear and one in the face—which he received from law enforcement officers during the course of his arrest.

"But I know that if I react in any way to what they do, then it is all over," he said. "I really am convinced of the need for me to be nonviolent, because it is the only way we will get anything done."

QUARTERS IN SHACK

Until his arrest last week, Reuss had been living in a shack in Section, a rural Negro community 3 miles outside West Point, with a fellow worker, Eddie Brooks, 20, from Sledge, Miss.

Together they rented the building for \$10 a month. They cleaned out hornet nests from the rafters, flattened cardboard boxes to cover the crevice-lined wooden floor, and papered the walls. They covered the open windows with transparent plastic sheets.

Then Brooks began his task—political canvassing of the community to raise petitions for better roads and to ask farmers to register to vote.

Reuss started a school in one of the community's two churches. The church, Old St. Peters, is a white frame Baptist church. He teaches young children and talks to teenagers about what they can do to bring about compliance with new Federal laws.

SOME OF DIFFICULTIES

In the afternoon he walks 3 miles to another Negro community where he has started another school.

"It's hard to say how effective these schools are," Reuss said. "Some of the younger kids are so shy and backward that all I can get them to do is draw."

"One little girl wouldn't say anything to me the first day. She just drew circles. But she trusts me, and now she's beginning to talk a little."

I think what we can help these people achieve, above all, is the knowledge that they can do something for themselves—against 100 years of proof that they can't."

For example, Reuss and Brooks are trying to persuade some Negro farmers to run for the Agricultural Stabilization Control Board, which tells farmers how many acres of cotton they can plant.

ANSWERED CALL

Why did he go down to Mississippi? "The people down here asked for volunteers, and I'd been thinking about this for a long time. I don't enjoy the risks, but there's too little time to get started anywhere else this summer, and a lot left to do here."

Like other workers with the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee, Mike lives on \$15 a week. His shack has no refrigerator, so he and Brooks eat out of cans—beans, salmon and more beans.

Local residents give them supplies of corn, potatoes, flour, and okra. "We're invited out to dinner a lot, too," Reuss said.

FONG GIVES VIEWS ON PACIFIC STATE PLAN

Mr. FONG. Mr. President, I am pleased to call the attention of my colleagues to a recent interview in which I discussed the proposal for annexing the Pacific Trust Territory to the State of Hawaii. Mr. Harrison Humphries, of the Associated Press, who has covered congressional affairs affecting Hawaii for many years, posed a number of questions to me as a result of my intention recently announced in this Chamber, to submit a resolution soon in order to obtain a consensus of the Congress as to the feasibility and desirability of the annexation proposal.

Mr. Humphries' questions are similar to those which have been put to me by numerous persons in official and private life. Therefore, I am delighted that the answers I furnished Mr. Humphries have been released nationally through the Associated Press. For it is evident that considerable public information and discussion on the subject will be both necessary and useful in order to acquaint more Americans with the peoples and problems of Micronesia.

I have every confidence in the wisdom of the approach I am recommending to prepare all parties concerned for the time when the question of the eventual destiny of the Trust Territory peoples will have to be decided.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the interview printed in the Honolulu Star-Bulletin of August 9, 1965.

There being no objection, the interview was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

FONG GIVES VIEWS ON PACIFIC STATE PLAN

(By Harrison Humphries)

WASHINGTON.—Statehood for the U.S. Trust Territory of Pacific Islands, which lie roughly 3,000 miles west of Hawaii, was described today by Senator HIRAM L. FONG as "realistic and logical."

Fong is drafting a resolution for introduction in Congress to authorize a study that could lead to annexation of the islands to the State of Hawaii as an alternative to

independence. The islands have been under U.S. trusteeship for the United Nations since World War II.

An interview with Fong produced these questions and answers concerning the future of the islands:

Question. Senator FONG, is your proposal to annex the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands to the State of Hawaii aimed at giving residents of the islands greater self-government responsibility?

Answer. Yes. The purpose is to integrate them into a sovereign State so that they may exercise the ultimate in American citizenship.

Question. Would they automatically become citizens of the United States and the State of Hawaii, with the right to vote for President and Governor and to travel and move without restriction any place within the United States?

Answer. This would be by action of the U.S. Congress. All of this predisposes that Congress would pass the necessary enabling legislation for Hawaii to do it and to grant citizenship.

Question. Would you envision that the islands of the trust territory would form a single and separate county government?

Answer. The 2,141 islands and atolls, of which 96 are inhabited, are now broken up into six districts, with their own district councils. They are the Marshall Islands district, Ponape district, Truk district, Yap district, Palau district, and Mariana Islands district.

With 87,000 people, they might be constituted into two or three counties, or one big county. This is so far away I haven't given any real thought to it.

The distances are great, and because of the tremendous distances, maybe the retention of six districts would prove most feasible. The trust territory embraces an area, including water, as large as the United States.

Question. Would Hawaii's State-financed public school system be extended to the territory?

Answer. At present the Federal Government is spending about \$17.5 million a year for schools, roads, public health, and other public services in the trust territory islands. I believe equity will induce the U.S. Congress to help in this regard, for a period of years at least.

Question. Could the State of Hawaii assume financial responsibility for these services without continued Federal assistance?

Answer. That would be quite a burden. It would add nearly 10 percent to Hawaii's budget.

Question. Do you think the people of Hawaii and the trust territory would favor annexation?

Answer. I don't know. This is all exploration at this point. I think the first reaction of the people of the trust territory would be against it in the belief they would be giving away some of their local autonomy. Yet, if they give the matter some thought, instead of having the Congress of Micronesia they would have representation in the State of Hawaii Legislature.

The United Nations trusteeship is a temporary political existence and it was hoped that they would be taken out of their present status, which is more of a colonial status, and be given independence.

Now, independence to these groups of islands would be very, very burdensome, as the economies there will be unable to sustain this form of government.

Landwise, we are talking about 687 square miles with 87,000 population. I believe the ultimate aspiration of these people would be to be part and parcel of the United States of America, and annexation by Hawaii would be realistic and logical.

That this question is now under discussion is a very good answer to the Soviet charges that we have been derelict in our duty to

August 11, 1965

of every community of these United States in the support of our great country. In the case of Allentown and Camp Crane, your citizens had a direct outlet where they could help the servicemen stationed here and, in a sense, could observe and measure the results of that help in the morale, the esprit, and even the efficiency and record established by the Ambulance Corps when it went into combat. These citizens realized that this road between the military community and civilian community was a two-way street; they insured that traffic moved easily in both directions. They realized full well that this was their Army.

Many other communities do not have such a direct or measurable outlet for their efforts, but there are many—I repeat, many—ways to serve. Our schools, our churches, our service clubs, our youth organizations—the YMCA, the YWCA, our boy and girl scouts—all need the full backing of their communities and the individual citizens in them, if they are to help keep America as the strong leader of the free world. The strength of our Nation stems from the grassroot strength of the thousands of communities such as this—and the millions of citizens who make them up and who support these United States.

As we open this fair today and honor the more than 20,000 members of the U.S. Ambulance Corps who trained at Camp Crane, and as we revere the memory of those in that group who have answered their final roll call, I would leave you then, with these three thoughts which I hope will serve well, the citizens of Allentown and the other communities represented here, as guidelines for the future: First, service, the muscle of America; second, sacrifice, the soul of America; and third, community action or, better perhaps, positive, aggressive citizenship in action, the pulse of America, as reflected by the citizens of Allentown four and a half decades ago.

In closing let me honor those men of the ambulance corps who gave their lives defending freedom, and defending our country, with the following lines by Laurence Binyon. They are taken from his poem, "For the Fallen":

"They went with songs to the battle, they were young, straight of limb, true of eye, steady and aglow.
They were stanch to the end against odds uncounted.
They fell with their faces to the foe.
They shall not grow old, as we that are left grow old;
Age shall not weary them, nor the years condemn.
At the going down of the sun and in the morning—
We will remember them."

May I wish this fair and each of you here the best of success this year and in the years ahead.

Thank you.

Not Guilty, More or Less

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. A. WILLIS ROBERTSON
OF VIRGINIA

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Wednesday, August 11, 1965

Mr. ROBERTSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Appendix of the Record the at-

tached article from the August 10 issue of the Richmond News Leader, which gives an object lesson on how to promote good government by registering illiterates.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Richmond News Leader, Aug. 10, 1965]

NOT GUILTY, MORE OR LESS

You will read a lot of law books, Algernon, before you will come across a jury trial quite like a jury trial just held in Collier County, Fla.

We get the tale from the Miami Herald. It appears that on on July 21, a white man named Thomas M. D'Andrea came on trial in the county court on a charge of "interfering with telephone service," in connection with the theft of \$7,500 worth of telephone wire along the Tamiami Trail.

An all-Negro jury was impaneled, which seems a bit odd, for the county is only 15 percent colored, but that is what happened. The custom is for the names of jurors to be drawn from lists of registered voters. In Florida, voting registration requirements were changed a few years ago so as to do away with any form of literacy test.

The trial proceeded; the six-man jury retired to consider its verdict, and after 2 hours' deliberation returned to the courtroom. Clerk Margaret T. Scott read what had been handed her by the foreman, Melt Williams.

"Not guilty," she announced.

There came murmurs of protest from the jury box. Proceedings were suspended while State Attorney Frank Schaub conducted an investigation.

It turned out that Foreman Williams was illiterate, and could neither read nor write. He had placed his mark on a piece of paper handed him.

Another juror, Tom Jones, also was illiterate. "We were 2 to 4 for conviction," he said. "Then all six of us decided he was guilty as charged. When I heard the verdict, I was greatly surprised."

A third juror, however, one Warren E. Adkins, said, "We all decided he was not guilty."

A fourth juror, Alonzo Howard, said that he himself thought the defendant not guilty, but "We said to Melt Williams, 'do anything you want to.' I thought we found him guilty."

A fifth juror, Angus Lawson, Jr., said: "We decided he was innocent. At the end of the deliberations, confusion set in. We told Melt Williams to sign anything he wanted to. I do not know if he signed the 'guilty' or 'not guilty' verdict. I did not know he could not read or write."

The sixth juror is not quoted in the account at hand.

Melt Williams, the foreman, said no one ever elected him foreman. They all got to talking in the jury room, he said, and "some of the members said if we found this white man guilty, the judge would turn him loose, and he would come looking for us. I believe I was tricked. All five of the others decided he was guilty."

Mr. Schaub, the State Attorney, has moved to have the entire proceeding vacated and the case tried anew, but defense counsel understandably has objected on the grounds of double jeopardy.

Under the newly signed Voting Rights Act of 1965, literacy tests are banned in Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and 34 counties of North Carolina. Doubtless this will improve the elective process. It would not do much for the jury system, either.

Fe. 11, 1965
To Win in Vietnam: Gandhi's Grandson Urges "Ideological Escalation"

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. ALEC G. OLSON

OF MINNESOTA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, August 11, 1965

Mr. OLSON of Minnesota. Mr. Speaker, a recent copyrighted article written by Rajmohan Gandhi and distributed by the North American Newspaper Alliance came to my attention. I think the observations will be most interesting to the Members of this body. Gandhi is the grandson of two of India's greatest leaders—Mahatma Gandhi and Chakravarti Rajagopalachari, the first Indian to become Governor-General of his country. At 29, Rajmohan Gandhi is a powerful voice among the younger Indians and is regarded by many as a possible future Prime Minister of India.

Gandhi's article represents a fine endorsement of President Johnson and free men's fight against tyrannical communism. I include the article at this point:

TO WIN IN VIETNAM (By Rajmohan Gandhi)

NEW DELHI, August 7.—The recent bold announcement by President Johnson on Vietnam offers an opportunity for an Indian, proud of his country but also devoted to that mighty land of America, to speak his mind.

First let me say that the men and women of Asia who want liberty for their countries welcome America's courageous stand. I personally believe that, in defending freedom in Vietnam, America is also defending it in India, and for this reason:

Suppose we were to have a Communist regime in South Vietnam—or even the so-called Nationalist-Communist or Tito-style regime which certain powerful voices recommend, including most recently the former British Foreign Secretary Patrick Gordon-Walker speaking in West Virginia. I think it is impossible to prove that such a regime would in fact be independent of Peking. But be that as it may, what happens to the other nations?

What happens to Thailand? Marshal Chen Yi, the Chinese Foreign Minister, spoke recently about soon "starting another Vietnam in Thailand." These are his openly proclaimed threats or promises, whichever way you look at it.

A TITOIST IRELAND?

If you have a Tito-style Communist regime in Vietnam, there will soon be a clamoring for the same kind of regime in Thailand. The next step is a Tito-style Communist regime in Malaysia, then the Philippines, then in Pakistan, then in Ceylon—finally in India. And so on until you recommend Tito-style Communist regimes for every country in Asia and Africa.

I wonder how Mr. Gordon-Walker would feel about a Tito-style Communist regime, say, in Ireland. I don't imagine he would feel too comfortable about it.

Certainly we in India would not be comfortable with a Tito-style Communist regime in Vietnam. Vietnam is the occasion, the point of contact for the great struggle between the Communist and non-Communist worlds. It could have been any other part of the world that symbolized that struggle. Today it happens to be Vietnam.

Appendix

Ceremony Honoring Veterans of the U.S. Ambulance Corps of World War I

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. FRED B. ROONEY

OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, August 11, 1965

Mr. ROONEY of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, last Friday, August 6, it was my distinct pleasure to attend the grand opening of the Allentown, Pa. fair and to introduce the main speaker at a ceremony honoring the veterans of the U.S. Ambulance Corps of World War I.

The speaker on this occasion was Maj. Gen. Eugene A. Salet, commandant of the U.S. Army War College at Carlisle, Pa. Aside from the excellence of his remarks, which was to be expected, I found General Salet to be among the most brilliant and genuinely dedicated men it has been my privilege to meet and know in recent years.

It is not necessary, of course, to praise the magnificent work that has been done for many years and continues to be done by the War College at Carlisle. This institution is among the most distinguished of its kind anywhere in the world. I can only add that the college—and the Nation—is fortunate, indeed, in having a man of General Salet's extraordinary abilities as its commandant.

There was ample reason for the Army's gesture in allowing General Salet to make the main address at this impressive and colorful ceremony. For the grounds occupied by the Allentown fair were once used as the training camp—Camp Crane—for the hundreds of devoted Americans who chose to serve overseas in the Ambulance Corps.

I want to say a personal word of gratitude of Mr. Ed Leidig, president of the Allentown fair, for arranging this notable tribute to a group of volunteers who served their Nation selflessly and, in many cases, with the last full measure of patriotic devotion. Mr. Leidig, in addition to managing the most successful and enjoyable fair in eastern America, has never been excelled as a dynamic contributor to the affairs of his community.

I hope that my colleagues will take a few moments to study the text of General Salet's fine address at the memorial to members of the U.S. Ambulance Corps. I include his remarks as a part of the record of these proceedings:

CEREMONY HONORING THE U.S. AMBULANCE SERVICE OF WORLD WAR I

(Remarks by Maj. Gen. Eugene A. Salet at the Allentown Fair, August 6, 1965)

I am particularly grateful to be with the citizens of Allentown, Lehigh County, and the many others here from eastern Pennsyl-

vania and elsewhere for this fair opening today.

Such an occasion as this—when I see citizens taking time during the bustle and business of opening day to honor our veterans and, in particular here, to honor the memory of those who served in the U.S. Ambulance Corps during the First World War—demonstrates to me that true American citizenship and true American patriotism are very much alive in Pennsylvania. I have seen many such manifestations of strong patriotic feeling in the Keystone State since arriving at Carlisle Barracks over a year ago, and I commend you and the other citizens of this great Commonwealth for it—and for demonstrating it.

We honor here today the members—the veterans—of the U.S. Ambulance Corps because in a real sense, Camp Crane, which was located on these very grounds in 1917 and 1918, was its first real home. In addition to the assembling, organizing, training, and equipping the corps that took place here, Camp Crane is where much of the cohesiveness, the morale, and the *esprit de corps* for the U.S. Ambulance Corps was developed—or perhaps ingrained is a better word. And these are the things that, in large part, carried its members through many weeks and months of gallant service on the western front in France and also along the Italian front during World War I, carrying the wounded from the battlefields to hospitals behind the lines.

The Ambulance Corps needs no eulogy from me here today, or from any other man. It has written its own proud history in deed, in courage—and in service to our country. The chauffeurs, the mechanics, the privates, and sergeants, the officers—Americans from all walks of life—many of whom trained on this soil where we gather today, established a record of service that still stands as their great monument—and mere words spoken here can add little to it.

It is said that many of the early volunteer ambulance drivers, before the United States officially entered the war, were young men from colleges throughout our Nation. The desire of these young Americans to serve as volunteer drivers in support of the French became a veritable crusade on many of the college campuses of America back at that time. Some 325 men volunteered from Harvard University alone; 181 volunteered from Princeton University not far from here. Others came from the University of Pennsylvania. It was not long until 64 colleges and every State in the Union were represented in the more than 1,000 American volunteers, working through the American Red Cross, who had gone to help the French. Among these idealists of the early Ambulance Corps were some of the future great writers of later years—Ernest Hemingway who drove an ambulance on the Italian/Austrian Front, John Dos Passos, Robert Hillyer, William Seabrook, and others.

The historical accounts relate, too, how the citizens of Allentown opened their arms and their hearts to the men who trained here at Camp Crane in the later years of the war. Through the generous assistance of Mayor Reichenbach—your Allentown mayor at that time—and with the help of Allentown businessmen, groups of your citizens adopted one or more ambulance sections training at Camp Crane; befriended them, arranged entertainment for them; took them into their homes. The historical accounts further

record that religious leaders of your city delivered sermons to their congregations asking that every young soldier who attended church on Sunday in uniform be invited to a home in Allentown for dinner. Allentown newspapers also editorialized to help Colonel Persons—the commander here at that time and the soldiers and their units stationed at Camp Crane—to make them welcome here.

This benevolent reception by Allentown citizens some 45 years ago did much to build this strong *esprit* and this high morale of the ambulance corps which I mentioned earlier. Their brotherly attitude is beautifully summarized by the following lovely thought:

"I shall not pass through this world but once. If, therefore, there be any kindness I can show or any good thing I can do, let me do it now; let me not defer it, nor neglect it, for I shall not pass this way again."

From this brief, backward glance at the U.S. Ambulance Corps and its members who trained at Camp Crane, and the record of the citizens of Allentown who supported them—we as Americans can draw several examples that stand out clear, and which we will do well to observe today—in 1965—as we face the challenges that confront our Nation in the turbulent real world of today. I would like to leave you with three of these examples in the remaining minutes here.

First, service. In plain talk, ladies and gentlemen, the record of the U.S. Ambulance Corps and the Red Cross volunteers who preceded them can be stated in one word—service. It is certainly the most descriptive term I can think of. If freedom and initiative are the heart of America—then service is the muscle. Let us not forget the service given to our country by these men we honor here. Their service is certainly a heroic chapter in the history of American humanitarianism. Let us, neither, forget the spirit of service by the citizens of Allentown toward these men in 1917 and 1918. We need service like this today to keep America strong; to help America preserve the freedom and dignity of mankind wherever it is threatened by the evil forces of despotism and materialism who seek to destroy it every hour of every day.

Next, sacrifice. Sacrifice is giving of one's self. I think the record of the Ambulance Corps abounds in sacrifice. Of these initial volunteers, 127 were killed in action either serving as ambulance drivers or subsequently as regular servicemen in combat units. Many more were wounded. Ernest Hemingway was himself wounded while driving an ambulance on the Italian front—receiving some 237 separate fragment wounds in the legs from a trench mortar. Hemingway was awarded the Italian War Cross with citation for his action where he carried a wounded Italian soldier some distance to the rear even after he himself was wounded. We see that the sacrifices made by the men of the Ambulance Corps are being made again today by other Americans scattered throughout the world, many of whom are manning that thin red line and are fighting in the cause of freedom and human dignity. These sacrifices should serve as examples to each one of us as we look and work toward the future—with greater sacrifice.

My final point is the importance of the community—citing in this example the importance of the Allentown community—to the overall success of the U.S. Ambulance Corps; but in a broad sense, the importance

A4455

August 11, 1965

Approved For Release 2003/10/14 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300130015-9
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — APPENDIX

A4457

I believe a solution can still come to Vietnam. But it will require a radical change in the attitude of us all. The lesson which both we in India and you in America must learn is that you cannot win an ideological war without an ideology. It is a point that has got to be understood if there is to be any chance at all of winning the war out there.

PROBLEMS THE SAME

The problems of the Vietnamese are the same as the problems of all Asia and Africa, and in fact the whole world. They need economic progress. They need to learn to work hard, honestly, and unitedly. They need a stable, incorruptible leadership. They also need a fearless populace, who will not be terrorized by the Vietcong or lured by the blandishments of the Communists. They need a solution for the divisions between the Buddhist and the Catholics. They need an ideology which can unite all the different tribes, castes, racial, and political groups in a common goal.

DIEM KNEW THE NEED

The late President of South Vietnam, Ngo Dinh Diem, felt that only a revolution of character, and a resurgence of patriotism and faith, could bring the unity, incorruptibility and fearlessness before Communist threats and pressures that his country needed. Some time before he died, he requested me and my friends to help him "saturate Vietnam with a moral ideology." For various reasons he was stopped. Before he could proceed with his program, his regime was destroyed.

I thank God for the military strength of America, and for the economic aid which you have so long and so generously poured out for us in Asia—sometimes, I fear, without the appreciation you deserve. But no amount of either military or economic strength can, in itself, make up for ideological weakness.

America is constantly being faced with the dilemma—soft line or hard line, negotiations or war. Some say there should be more bombing in order to win the battle, but haven't a plan to win over the enemy after the battle is won. Others say we must go to the conference table, but haven't the slightest idea what to do when we meet the enemy face to face. They have no more conception of how the Vietcong or the North Vietnamese can be influenced and changed than they have of how the South Vietnamese can be united for the fight.

WHAT IS OUR PLAN?

If, however, America were to initiate an ideological escalation in Vietnam and throughout Asia, a final victory for freedom and justice would be assured, and every human need across that vast continent met.

Look at a map of Asia. Vietnam is only one country. There is also Thailand, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaya, Indonesia, Ceylon, Pakistan, India, Japan, Korea, Hong Kong. What is our plan for these nations while the Communists carry out their plan for Vietnam? In several of them an ideological awakening, based on the revolutionary principles which gave America birth, has already made a substantial penetration. Why should not this country plan to capture all of them with it?

Such an ideological offensive would produce disarray in Chinese ranks. It would produce instability and insecurity inside China and North Vietnam, but it would produce unity and strength inside Saigon and South Vietnam. If only the non-Communist world understood this simple point.

Look at Indonesia. The Indonesians don't make a move without consulting the leaders of Peking. Yet Indonesia can be won. There are thousands of Indonesian students in Australia, Japan, and the Philippines. Can we not train them and send them back? One of the major aims of the free world in

Asia should be to invade Indonesia ideologically.

HOPE FOR THE ENSLAVED

Suppose in Malaysia you succeeded in welding Malays, Chinese, and Indians into a strong, stable nation, creating there the launching pad for a militant moral ideology reaching into Indonesia and the whole of southeast Asia? Suppose you did that also in Thailand, before Chen Yi starts his activities? Suppose you did the same in Taiwan, and in Japan? The news would reach Peking instantly and the people of China would take hope.

Frankly, China is far more important than Vietnam. We are straining every nerve to resolve Vietnam, but we need to plan at the same time how to change China.

Many take it for granted that China and Russia will stay Communist. I don't. I believe communism in China and Russia can be superseded provided we of the non-Communist world, while matching them in the military field, resolve to more than match them in the decisive field of ideology. If Americans will lead us in this task, they will do for the world what Washington and Lincoln once did for the American Republic, and they will find all patriotic, freedom-loving Asians at their side.

See other side
Alliance for Progress Aids Both Latin America and American Business

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF

HON. RALPH YARBOROUGH

OF TEXAS

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Wednesday, August 11, 1965

Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, the Alliance for Progress, an office within the U.S. Agency for International Development, is a unique program in our international policy. Through this program, we are not only helping various Latin American countries to help themselves, but we are doing so in a way that private American businesses are participating, aiding and benefiting also. By coordinating an American "partner" with their talent, energy, and resources with a Latin American country which needs their assistance, we are truly creating partnerships—not handouts.

To demonstrate the work which this program is accomplishing, I ask unanimous consent that the article "A Hand, Not a Handout," printed on pages 2-4 of the July 12, 1965, issue of International Commerce, be printed in the Appendix of the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

A HAND, NOT A HANDOUT—PARTNERS OF ALLIANCE PROGRAM PROVIDES TWO-WAY CHANNEL FOR MEANINGFUL CONTACTS BETWEEN PRIVATE GROUPS IN UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

You too can be a companero—it just means partner, but somehow it sounds more dashing in Spanish. The Companeros de la Alianza (Partners of the Alliance) program provides channels through which civic clubs, unions, business and professional groups, and even private individuals in the United States can work directly with similar Latin American groups which have demonstrated their ability and determination to make a better way of life for themselves.

The U.S. participation in the Alliance for Progress is only partially fulfilled through official government-to-government programs. The direct participation of the people of the United States with the people of the various Latin American countries is an essential element to the success of the Alliance.

While many areas of close cooperation continue to flourish between governments, and between private and institutional organizations, direct individual or community activities has only just begun.

Efforts made by sincere citizens responding to the human needs of the Alliance frequently have been misdirected, or at best, uncoordinated.

The Partners of the Alliance, an office within the U.S. Agency for International Development, has been organized to respond to and coordinate the direct assistance activity between those in the United States who wish to help and those in Latin America who need help.

It helps coordinate the organizational talent, energies, and resources of the U.S. private sector with the administrative experience of the Agency for International Development to provide assistance for specified self-help projects.

The program is designed to respond to specific efforts of villages or slum organizations in meeting a productive need when there has been a demonstration of self-help interest. Most of the items needed are available in the country (and about 90 percent are U.S.-produced items) and in the interests of speedy response and simplified administrative handling, the funds are generally sent directly to the man designated in each American Embassy to be the partners' program representative.

BUSY FELLOW

He sees that the materials are properly purchased and delivered to the partnership village or association. He also arranges, where possible, for pictures of the project to send to the U.S. partner.

In some States the organization may involve only a part of the State *** with a view toward expanding to a statewide program at a later date. These committees are the "receivers" of specific projects from specific villages or organizations in a specific country. These projects are then "retailed" out to the various civic clubs, high school and university student groups, trade associations, leagues and organizations which finance the respective projects as its contribution to the cause of economic and social development in the hemisphere.

BIT BY BIT

The emphasis is on small-impact projects ranging in cost from a few dollars up to the neighborhood of \$1,600. The program's founders hope that a steadily mounting volume of small projects attacking the whole spectrum of grassroots needs, will, like a swarm of ants, eventually take enough tiny bites out of the massive body of Latin American poverty so that the whole structure crumbles.

Typical projects have included:

Furnishing a small generator to provide light for a village's night school course teaching adults how to read; cost \$125 to \$140 (including air freight costs from the United States.)

A pump to lift the water out of a well which villagers have already dug to serve their self-made community center; cost \$285.

A Texas labor organization supplying the funds to buy picks, shovels and wheelbarrows with which farmer in a remote mountain area of Peru built themselves a road connecting their village with a nearby highway.

Providing the cost of doors and windows after the villagers have built their own school; cost \$150 to \$350, depending on the size of the school.

Notice that in each case the projects were conceived and largely finished through local

August 11, 1965

A4458

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — APPENDIX

enterprise. All the respective partners of the Alliance had to do was furnish a relatively small boost to push the projects over the top.

The Partners of the Alliance staff serves as a catalyst, helping individuals and groups to turn their good intentions into concrete actions.

The initiative for forming a partnership can come from any source, even a private individual. To date such varied agencies as the Mobile (Ala.) Junior Chamber of Commerce, the Richmond League of Women Voters, the Colorado Society of Engineers, a group of businessmen in the University of Indiana's executive development program, the Wisconsin Electric Cooperative, and the superintendent of the Lane County (Oregon) School System have launched their State's participation in the program.

At the Latin American end, AID mission members bring the partners program to the attention of local leaders who, if they feel their area could benefit from it, request the Alliance for Progress headquarters to find a suitable partner for them. Partners for the Alliance personnel then try to match them up with a State or area in the United States which is similar economically and physically, and has requested a Latin partner.

The forms which the partnerships may take can be equally diverse, since the local groups are encouraged to work out their programs with a minimum of reliance on themselves, with either of their governments. Most often the relationships have resulted in exchanges of visits by groups of civic, business, and educational leaders to discover which cooperative efforts would have the greatest impact.

The program is most emphatically intended to be a two-way street, of mutual benefit to both parties.

NOT A HANDOUT PROGRAM

This is not a program through which a city or a State "adopts" a Latin American state or city. It is a partnership program designed to help people help themselves. It is not a patronizing or handout approach. It is not an "old clothes" charity program—it is a direct alliance between a U.S. group and a Latin American group to work toward the establishment of a lasting neighborhood relationship outside official channels.

Significantly, such relationships can provide two-way benefits outside the purely ideological and humanitarian aspects. Some years ago the tomato industry in Utah was seriously threatened by the appearance of a leaf blight. A resistant strain was found in Bolivia which saved an industry which was important to the economy of Utah. The current "Partners of the Alliance" relationship between Utah and Bolivia contemplates financing the shipment to Bolivia of tomato-canning equipment donated by industries in various areas of the United States.

Michigan's Oakland County Partners of the Alliance Committee, has sent an expert in municipal administration to act as an advisor in the Colombian State of Valle del Cauca. His assignment is the first phase of an extensive program for a continuing two-way direct-assistance alliance between the two communities.

In Oregon, 15 public school districts and Costa Rica have been linked in a double-pronged program providing in-service training for Costa Rican public school administrators and teachers, while at the same time affording Oregon schools the opportunity to utilize the Costa Ricans as experts in Spanish language programs and Latin American Social Studies activities.

James H. Boren, special assistant to the Coordinator of the Alliance for Progress, dreamed up the idea for the Partners of the Alliance while serving as director of the AID Mission in Peru. He says he's delighted with the 1-year-old program's record to date.

"Basically the initial phases of the program were rather spectacular," he says. "The per-

formance to date reflects the tremendous latent interest in hemispheric development. People have long had an interest in this sort of thing, and the Partners of the Alliance has finally given them a means of translating their interest into meaningful activity." It shows that people will respond if they are presented with a program that makes sense to them.

WORKS BOTH WAYS

"I can't stress the partnership angle too strongly," said Mr. Boren. "These arrangements are definitely two-way streets. Once we've made the initial contact for them, we rely on the partners themselves to figure out ways they can both benefit from the tie-up."

Mr. Boren spends a great deal of his time traveling throughout the United States and Latin America, explaining the program to interested groups. "We like to get representatives from the entire cross-section of a community's life: economic, civic, educational. If, after we've made our presentation, they are interested, we can sit right down and begin talking business."

When in Washington, Mr. Boren can be located in room 2911 of the New State Department. Phone: Area code 202, DUDley 3-7444.

See (Dr) Wilson
Marines in "New War" Make Friends by
Day, Kill Reds at Night

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF

HON. BOB WILSON

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, August 11, 1965

MR. BOB WILSON. Mr. Speaker, there appears to be a concerted and vicious campaign in certain newspapers to portray our gallant soldiers and marines on duty in Vietnam as cruel sadistic conquerors whose only mission is to destroy villages and helpless civilians. I resent such false implications and applaud the servicemen who are risking their lives in the mud and jungle heat to help defend liberty. Following are two recent news items from the San Diego Union, which refute the false propaganda:

[From the San Diego Union, Aug. 9, 1965]

MARINES IN "NEW" WAR—MAKE FRIENDS BY
DAY, KILL REDS AT NIGHT

(By Robert C. Miller)

QUI NHON, VIETNAM.—The marines have brought a new kind of war to Vietnam.

They are meeting the Vietcong on their own terms here in the hot, dusty, coastal hills of Binh Dinh province, 275 miles northeast of Saigon.

The unique policy of the 2d Battalion of the 7th Marines is to kill the Vietnamese people with kindness during the day, and kill the Vietcong with bullets at night.

Like the Communists, they disappear into the jungled hills during the night, move about Indian style, set up ambushes, listening posts, and checkpoints everywhere but where they are expected.

NEW TACTIC

Nobody has fought the Communists like this around here before.

There are no PX's out here in these mountains and valleys.

Sometimes there isn't even any food, but there is plenty of ammunition, firepower, helicopters, and artillery. There is a shortage of water, but an abundance of strong backs.

There is no beer—either iced or warm—but there are gallons of sweat. There are no beds, bunks, sheets, or pillowcases, but how one can sleep with exhaustion as a sedative. The only people who live more primitively than these marines are Australian aborigines—or maybe the Vietcong.

There is Hotel Company, which has hidden by day and scrambled the hills by night for nights on end with talk restricted to whispers, and smoking forbidden.

There is Echo Company, which has been roosting atop a 1,500-foot ridge for days, living in holes, eating mainly crackers and scouring the area for action.

During the daylight hours it is a different story. The marines, big tanks snort and grind up and down the roads.

Baseball games are played on the world's dustiest fields. Helmeted patrols slouch along highways and by-ways with their shiny, well-oiled weapons a screaming contrast to the stinking, sweat-soaked, dust-caked clothes they wear.

DISPENSE RATIONS

Wherever there are people, there are friendly marines passing out "C" rations, plastic spoons, chocolate and gum. Any marine could be elected mayor of any village here if the voting age was limited to 10 years.

In villages like Phu Tai and Cu Mong, deserted for years because of Vietcong terror, the marines have set up free hospital facilities and rice kitchens to help old residents who are drifting back to their homes.

Come nightfall, however, the marines disappear, just like the Vietcong.

Never are the outposts planted in the same place twice. Never do the lookouts give the Reds a permanent target.

Sometimes they are on the ground, sometimes they are high in the trees, tied up there all night, watching and waiting for their enemy.

The battalion commander, Lt. Col. Leon Utter, has one inviolable rule:

The patrols stay out all night whether two, three, four men or a squad. Their fire-power is quadruple that of the Vietcong, and, says Utter, "they're four times better men."

NO CASUALTIES

There have been dozens of skirmishes with the elusive enemy since the marines took over early in July. Every one has been a one-sided affair with no serious marine casualties.

Already five Vietcong suspects have deserted and come over voluntarily to the marines, bringing with them a wealth of intelligence, and each reports the same thing: frustration by the local Red leaders and growing dissension in the ranks.

They have chased the Vietcong out of areas they have considered theirs for years. The Reds have lost face, the populace is watching them. The "soft," "imperialistic" Americans, the "paper tigers," have turned out to be smiling heavy-muscled youngsters who thrive like prairie dogs in the hot, baked earth, oblivious to dust, thirst, hunger, and danger.

[From the San Diego Union, Aug. 9, 1965]

BACK FROM VIETNAM—COMMANDER LAUDS
MARINE BATTALION

(By Frank Exarhos)

Pride and satisfaction battled against weariness in the expression of Lt. Col. Charles E. McPartlin as he watched the marines in his battalion disembark yesterday at Broadway pier.

He was proud and satisfied because, as he put it, "I've never seen such spirit; you just can't get them down."

He was weary because the battalion had been a combat unit in South Vietnam since March.

August 11, 1965

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — APPENDIX

A4459

"I can't say enough for them," he said yesterday. "They've had one of the hardest tours of any battalion in the Far East but they held up wonderfully."

"They had good training and they were young and eager. They did fine."

The average age of the Leathernecks in the battalion, which was one of the first combat units to land in Vietnam, is 20 years.

The unit was part of the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade which landed at Da Nang in March. It has been redesignated as the 2d Battalion of the 5th Marine Regiment and will rejoin the 1st Marine Division at Camp Pendleton.

"First we're going to give them 30 days' leave," McPartlin said.

"Or there you don't know for sure who your enemy is, and you can't just go out and shoot everyone."

He said the marines chiefly fought guerrillas. He termed them "tough, good, but not as good as people make them out to be."

The marines had trouble with the heat and with mosquitoes, he said, when they first went ashore but soon adjusted.

"The battalion was hit by Vietcong on its third day ashore, but lost no men," McPartlin said. He made no estimate of casualties inflicted on the Communist forces.

"They're pretty good at snatching their wounded and dead," he said, "We'd find bloodstains but few bodies, so we could only guess."

McPartlin was asked if 125,000 U.S. troops will be enough in Vietnam.

"I don't think so," he replied, "It's hard to make an estimate. It's going to take a lot of men to isolate the Vietcong from their bases of supply."

He said Vietnamese marines who worked with the battalion at Da Nang were outstanding.

"We didn't have any problems."

The graying veteran of 33 years' service in the Marine Corps, which included World War II and Korea, commented again on the morale of the men in the battalion.

"This welcome today is wonderful," he said, "Over there they'd read about the demonstrations against what they were doing."

"They couldn't understand why any red-blooded American wouldn't back them. They want the wholehearted support of the people."

be inserted in the Appendix of the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

PERIODONTAL DISEASE IN DEVELOPING NATIONS—A DEBILITATING DENTAL PROBLEM WHICH AFFECTS MILLIONS SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN PUBLIC HEALTH PROGRAMS ABROAD

(By Harold S. Sinrod)

(NOTE.—The author practices dentistry at 6124 River Road, Bethesda, Md. In 1955 and 1956 he was oral surgeon, and in 1957 chief of the dental service, at the U.S. Army 2d Field Hospital, Munich, Germany.)

Recent surveys conducted by the U.S. Interdepartmental Committee on Nutrition for National Defense have demonstrated rather conclusively that one of the most neglected health problems facing the people of Asian and African countries studied is periodontal disease.

This disease is a complex inflammation of the supporting tissues of the teeth which usually first manifests itself in the marginal gingival areas of the dental arch. Eventually the underlying alveolar bone around the roots of the teeth is destroyed and the teeth involved must be removed to relieve the patient's suffering.

When a disease of any kind affects the health, comfort, and personal dignity of 8 out of 10 adults in the prime of life, as it does in Vietnam, for example,¹ it presents the nation concerned with a problem of such proportions, that our failure to provide some sort of assistance is difficult to understand. The fact remains, however, that in most instances, dental health is completely ignored even in those countries where public health programs are underway.

The purpose of this paper is to shed more light on the problem of periodontal disease in the less-developed areas of the world and, more important, to propose a program for prevention and treatment that would rapidly effect a large measure of control where today none exists. This plan need not be costly, especially when compared with expenditures for other programs that do not have the same widespread potential impact at the grassroots level that a dental health program would have.

Surveys by the U.S. Interdepartmental Committee on Nutrition for National Defense (ICNND) have demonstrated rather convincingly that tooth decay is a surprisingly insignificant factor in the underdeveloped nations. For example, in Ethiopia, 77 percent of the people examined were totally free of caries and those under 40 years of age averaged less than one DMF (decayed, missing, or filled) tooth per person.² In Vietnam, the ICNND team discovered only a slightly higher incidence of decay than in Ethiopia,³ and concluded that the need for treatment of caries in this area of the world is very small at present.¹ Again, in Thailand, ICNND found tooth decay practically nonexistent, with an average of 0.13 decayed, missing, or filled tooth for the 0- to 9-year age group; 0.71 for the 10- to 19-year age group; and 0.84 for the 20- to 29-year age group.³

The same surveys, however, revealed a shockingly high incidence of periodontal disease in these countries. In Ethiopia, periodontal disease was found to be widespread and severe after age 30.³ In Vietnam, 30 percent of the people were found to have the disease in advanced stages by the age of 25 to 29, and 84 percent were so afflicted at age 50 or over.¹ Only 9 percent of the people examined in Vietnam over the age of 10 were free of the disease; field workers from the U.S. National Institute of Dental Research commented that they had never observed

such a high incidence of periodontal disease as in this country.¹ In Thailand, where tooth decay is practically nonexistent, the surveys showed that, by the age of 44, 75 percent of the people are afflicted with severe irreparable damage due to periodontal disease.³

Similarly, studies in India⁴ have revealed that over 80 percent of the children in certain areas suffer from periodontal disease severe enough to involve alveolar bone loss in many of the 12-to-16-year-olds studied and in almost all of those over the age of 16.⁴ The Chief Minister of Mysore, S. B. D. Jatti, said in 1959:

"It was discovered that the high prevalence of periodontal disease in children is almost 80 percent. This shows the magnitude of the problem we have to face. The children who form the life-blood of the country cannot on any account be neglected ***. Even when they grow to manhood they suffer from periodontal disease and its attendant complications. They lose teeth and get old prematurely. The longevity of life is shortened and their working capacity too is lessened. We must have real teeth up to ripe old age."

A. L. Russell, chief of the Epidemiology and Biometry Branch of the National Institute of Dental Research, and recently chairman of the World Health Organization's Expert Committee on Dental Health, which reported on periodontal disease, stated in an interview that local factors, primarily calculus (a hard irritating deposit of the saliva which forms on the teeth) and poor oral hygiene, are the "overwhelming" causative factors observed by the ICNND survey teams.⁵ Proof of this contention was demonstrated in Ethiopia, where the ICNND group reported that the extent of the calculus deposits was directly related to the condition of the periodontal tissues, abundant deposits of calculus and food debris having been observed in virtually all mouths examined.² There was much less evidence of periodontal disease in groups of patients with small amounts of calculus or debris, whereas it was present in more advanced stages in groups with heavy calculus and debris.² In Vietnam, heavy deposits of calculus were present in the mouths of nearly every person aged 12 or older.²

Furthermore, of Vietnamese soldiers who had the benefit of regular prophylaxis and who had been taught the techniques and benefits of good oral hygiene, only 20 percent suffered from periodontal disease, whereas their civilian counterparts had a 41-percent disease rate.¹ Again, in Thailand, ICNND found a significant difference in the disease rate of military and civilian males. At an average age of 33, only 20 percent of the military as opposed to 50 percent of the civilians were afflicted with periodontal disease.³ These significant findings provide strong support for the effectiveness of simple calculus removal and improved oral hygiene in the treatment and control of periodontal disease in an affected population.

In view of the critical shortage of dentists in these countries, the problem seems at first glance to defy solution. In Afghanistan, for example, there are only 57 dentists in a population of 13 million people, or 1 for every 228,000 people.⁶ In Vietnam, there are 74 dentists for 12.6 million people, or 1 for 170,300 people.³ In Thailand, there are 232 dentists for 21 million citizens, with a ratio of 1 dentist to 92,600 people.⁶ Similarly, India has 3,681 dentists for 397 million people, or 1 dentist for every 108,000 people. Compare these figures with the ratio in the United States of 1 dentist per 1,700 people. It is readily apparent that unless a radical new approach is taken in prevention and treatment of this disease, it will continue unchecked.

SCARCITY OF DENTISTS

In the past, the United States has brought a handful of dentists to this country for advanced training in our modern dental

Footnotes at end of speech.

A4460

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — APPENDIX

August 11, 1965

techniques. Too many of these dentists return to the metropolitan areas of their respective countries and practice high-class dentistry for their own upper-class countrymen and the international set. Meanwhile, the great masses of the people receive no professional care at all, while they suffer much dental misery. It is obvious that these millions cannot wait while a handful of students are trained for 5 to 8 years, as dentists are in the technologically advanced countries of the world. The needs are different, and a new approach must be taken.

I propose that semiliterate individuals, if necessary, could be trained to perform a useful service in the prevention of periodontal disease. Techniques for calculus removal and for demonstration of good oral-hygiene procedures, in my opinion, could be taught in a short period of time to large numbers of people. These people, citizens of the country in question, working under a well-supervised program, could perform a substantial amount of preventive dentistry in the fight against periodontal disease. We must make this rather sharp departure from traditional dental education in certain areas of Africa and southeast Asia or no gains will be made in the dental health of the average citizen for many decades, if ever.

I believe that the dental aids prepared by this program could be trained in a short time (4 to 6 months) to satisfactorily remove calculus, perform simple extractions, and disseminate information on oral hygiene. After 6 months of work in the field under direct and constant supervision by fully trained dentists, the dental aid would be sent back to his village to care for the most pressing dental needs of his neighbors. He would institute a program aimed at the prevention and control of periodontal disease by regularly removing the calculus and oral debris of those in his village. In addition, he would demonstrate the oral-hygiene techniques which are so important for the prevention of periodontal disease. To relieve the suffering of those already victims of advanced periodontal disease, the aid would be able to perform simple extractions painlessly, using local anesthetics.

Another possibility would be to send dental aids, working in pairs, on a prearranged route through a large area of the countryside, where they would spend several days in each village in their zone and thus treat a large percentage of the people at least once a year. At these cleaning sessions, the importance of dental health and good oral hygiene would be emphasized, and perhaps some informative literature and descriptive posters distributed. Toothbrush technique would be demonstrated. The ICNND report on Vietnam¹ hinted at this approach when it stated:

"In view of the magnitude of the periodontal disease problem among the people of Vietnam, serious consideration should be given to the training and use of dental assistants in scaling and cleaning of the teeth."

A TRAINING CURRICULUM

The training of the dental aids should be simple and radically brief compared to previous standards. Since these aids will only remove calculus and oral debris with hand instruments and perform simple tooth extractions, 4 to 6 months of intensive training should be sufficient.

The curriculum I suggest for this "short course" for dental aids is as follows:

1. Elementary instruction in the function and structure of the mouth.
2. Instruction in techniques for sterilization of instruments.
3. Elementary instruction in recognition of severe oral diseases which should be referred to supervising dentist.
4. Thorough instruction and clinical practice in the technique of calculus removal.
5. Instruction in administration of local anesthetics.

6. Instruction in methods for the control of bleeding and infection.

7. Instruction and practice in the technique of simple tooth extraction.

8. Instruction in the importance of dental health and the preventive techniques of good oral hygiene.

In order to rapidly develop a more comprehensive dental program, it is recommended that the outstanding dental aids, after a period of service, be eligible for advanced training of 18 months duration which would equip them to handle more complicated oral surgery. They would also be trained thoroughly in the techniques of prosthetic dentistry so they could provide replacement teeth for victims of incurable periodontal disease.

It is possible to project this program into the future. As time goes by, the dental education of the public will create an appreciation of good dental health and, consequently, a demand for complete dental care that does not exist now; there will then be a need for thoroughly trained general dentists. An advanced dental aid who performed his duties outstandingly could qualify for the highest level of training—a 3-year course in general dentistry. These dentists would be trained to provide complete dental service, including the restoration of decayed teeth, and some would be prepared to administer and supervise the continuing dental-aid program.

This opportunity for advancement from one level to another in the dental-health program provides a built-in inducement for outstanding performance, because this is an unusual chance for a person in these countries to advance quickly to the relatively high status of a professional.

Before an interested country could undertake a program of this type, a careful survey similar to those conducted by the ICNND team would be required in order to estimate accurately the extent and relative severity of the periodontal problem. It would then be possible to estimate the number of dental aids and professional supervisory personnel required to meet the needs of the country in question. The survey would also make it possible to estimate the cost of the program.

The dental aid program should be directed by dentists, since they have the knowledge and experience required to administer such a program. It has been proven in the past, notably in the U.S. Armed Forces, that a dental health service cannot be directed effectively by nondental personnel.

I suggest that a pilot project be arranged in an interested country to test the efficiency of a program of this type under actual field conditions. The experienced survey team of the National Institute of Dental Research could estimate the periodontal conditions and personnel required, and volunteer dentists from other countries could work closely with the dentists of the country to establish the training program and field operation of the dental aids. At the end of a year, the survey team could examine the patients treated and compare the findings for these patients with those for a control group. I think that the improvement in the treated group would be marked, even in this short period of time.

If, because of a lack of administrative talent or the necessary funds, it is not possible for an interested country to implement a full-scale dental aid program, a program for the control of periodontal disease could be incorporated into a public health or community nurse program, where one is in existence or being developed. Dental aid training, including training in exodontia for the relief of pain, under the supervision of a dentist, would be included in the curriculum of the public health officer or nurse. The public health officer, when on assignment in the rural clinics of his country, would in turn train a dental aid to work in his clinic.

If no such trainee is available, the nurse would give occasional demonstrations of oral hygiene to the people in the area, in addition to performing the vital function of extracting painful teeth. Obviously, the public health officer would be so burdened with other community health problems that a true preventive dental program would stand little chance. However, public health officers would be made aware of the dental problems existing in their districts, and a start would be made in the right direction.

The assistance of the more fortunate countries of the world should be extended to every need—there should be no blind spots.

SUMMARY

Periodontal disease is a great and as yet untreated problem in developing countries. The vast majority of the people whom we are trying to help in other ways suffer from this disease. They do not ask for help in this area because in most cases they are not aware that anything can be done about it. We must educate them to the full significance of this disease and help them eradicate it. Although the number of dentists in these countries is inadequate to cope with the problem, a program in which dental aids are trained in techniques for prevention and control of periodontal disease could help remedy the situation rapidly and economically.

When a disease affects the day-to-day comfort and physical well-being of men, women, and children in countries around the world, its treatment should be given top priority by those who are responsible for the dispersal of this aid. To those people at the grassroots level who receive and benefit from this most personal type of assistance, the ability to eat a meal without pain, to swallow a morsel of food well-chewed, hence escaping indigestion, and to avoid the embarrassment of premature tooth loss, could make this program one of the most appreciated aspects of the entire aid program to the emerging nations.

¹ "Nutrition Survey, Republic of Vietnam" (Interdepartmental Committee on Nutrition for National Defense, Bethesda, Md., July 1960).

² A. L. Russell, N. W. Littleton, E. C. Leatherwood, G. E. Sydow, J. C. Greene, "Public Health Reports," U.S. 75, 717 (1960).

³ "Nutrition Survey, The Kingdom of Thailand" (Interdepartmental Committee on Nutrition for National Defense, Bethesda, Md., February 1962).

⁴ W. C. Allright, R. J. S. Tickle, S. Matsunaga, Int. Dent. J. 10, 327 (1960).

⁵ S. B. D. Jatti, J. All-India Dental Association 31, 39 (May 1959).

⁶ A. L. Russell, personal communication.

⁷ "Nutrition Survey, Ethiopia" (Interdepartmental Committee on Nutrition for National Defense, Bethesda, Md., September 1959).

⁸ "WHO Directory of Dental Schools" (World Health Organization, Geneva, 1961).

Effect of the Social Security Increase on Veterans' Pensions

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF

HON. OLIN E. TEAGUE

OF TEXAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, August 11, 1965

Mr. TEAGUE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, much concern has been expressed about the effect of the recent social security increase on pensions payable to veterans

August 11, 1965

Approved For Release 2003/10/14 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300130015-9
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — APPENDIX

A4467

sylvania, are now pointing out. For if a congressional minority forever obstructs the right of the people themselves even to vote on this question, the States themselves can force Congress to call a convention to rewrite the Constitution. This grave step has never been taken, and any reasonable man can foresee what a box of eels and what a mare's nest it could open.

With all this in mind, this columnist asserts on more than 30 years of observation that no Senate group in all that time has ever acted more irresponsibly than the Douglases, the Clarks, the Kennedys and the like have acted here.

Re: Olin E. Teague
Vietnam: An Indigenous or Infiltrated Affair or Who Made the 7.62 Weapons?

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. ROBERT L. LEGGETT

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, August 11, 1965

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Speaker, it is a formidable task to mobilize a nation into an open-ended international police action committed on an as yet undetermined number of our youth to maintain a principle and the liberty of a people of another skin tone on the opposite side of the globe.

Some say the President leads by consensus. I personally believe that action conceived in moral and international right has a considerable amount to do with consensus.

The President has been extremely patient with the country as opinions have been formulated over the past year.

To those who argue that the South Vietnamese matter is totally indigenous—please explain the recent mass equipping of several hundred thousand Vietcong with new 7.62 weapons.

The police action nomenclature would appear to be appropriate where the party sought to be controlled appears to be motivated by a selfish bloodthirsty deceptive minority parading under a Communist banner and the controlling force has ambitions for no people, territory, bases, trade routes, or alliances and is carrying out the restraining action with patience, caution, and only a small percentage of available power.

Recent opinions from the Fourth District of California supporting the President are here reprinted from Hank Tweith's Independent Herald of Yuba City and Ed Davis' Willows Daily Journal:

[From the Yuba City (Calif.) Independent Herald, Aug. 2, 1965]

THE WAR DRAWS CLOSER

When President Johnson announced last week that draft calls would be doubled, he emphasized, among other things, how close to home the Vietnam conflict is coming.

For some time, only a small group of Sutter-Yuba youngsters have been called up monthly for compulsory military service—15 to be exact. Now, the number will jump to 30 and there is some possibility that the calls will eventually go higher than that.

However, as a matter of fact, we have had a local interest in Vietnam for some time. Hardly a week goes by that one or another

of the military branches through their public relations services doesn't report the presence in the area of belligerence of the son of some Sutter or Yuba County family aboard ship or at bases in the operational theater. A few have been casualties of the conflict.

The younger generation of today is one that must live with the probability that at some time in their lives they will have to don a military uniform and prepare for war if not actually fight in one. And the end of this condition is nowhere in sight.

The man in the street in Yuba City or Marysville can probably guess as closely as the man in the White House whether the escalation of military activity in Vietnam is the prelude to another worldwide war.

But no guessing is needed to realize that this country is committed to the obligation of serving as a planetary policeman to maintain some degree of order and to protect the political system under which we want to live.

We cannot withdraw from Vietnam without inviting a wave of aggression not only in Asia but in Africa and possibly even in Europe. We are committed to the policy of participating in small conflicts in the hope—and it is no more than that—that we can discourage insane or barbarian societies from triggering a world conflagration that could destroy us all.

The United States is in the position as a nation of any policeman who cannot expect to prevent all crime but whose existence keeps criminals from freely overrunning the more intelligent and reasonable elements of the community.

[From the Willows Daily Journal,
Aug. 5, 1965]

STAKES ARE BIG IN VIET CONFLICT

It must be of little comfort to mothers with sons in the armed services, or with sons of draftable age, to know that the United States is nearing full-fledged war in South Vietnam; that plans call for boosting the total number of men in the services to 3 million by a year from now.

President Johnson has been the target for vehement opposition from some Senators, Congressmen, and other citizens for his course in Vietnam. But what else could he have done?

Time after time the United States has proposed entering into negotiations—only to have its offers flatly rejected. What other course remains except to suffer defeat or to withdraw?

Why either of these alternatives is unthinkable and why the United States entered the conflict in the first place, during President Eisenhower's administration, is explained lucidly by Joseph Alsop, a newspaper columnist.

"The United States," he writes, "had a vital stake in Vietnam from the very outset—long before that stake had been approximately decoupled, as it has been in the present state of the problem. If President Eisenhower had not moved to protect this vital American interest, the consequences would have been as follows:

"First, this American failure to oppose aggression in Vietnam would have enormously increased the difficulty of honoring our commitments elsewhere in southeast Asia. For instance, the defense of Thailand, to which the United States is solemnly pledged, would have become all but impossible without the gravest risk of a third world war.

"Second, the difficulty mentioned above would have flowed, in quite a large part, from the loss of the historic American position as a major Pacific power. Changes of orientation in Japan and the Philippines, even deeper changes in places like Taiwan and South Korea, would have led to the virtual expulsion of American power from the

Western Pacific. The United States would have had 'pull back to Hawaii,' as Gen. Maxwell Taylor put it to President Johnson.

"After pulling back to Hawaii, the United States would be unable to bring to bear any real power, except strategic nuclear power, on the far shore of the Pacific—let alone southeast Asia and the coasts of the Indian Ocean, as was oddly suggested by one who had evidently not bothered to explore the limits of normal air and naval action.

"President Eisenhower was unwilling to lose this supposedly nonvital stake in the Pacific, to defend which this country sent millions of men to fight overseas in the Second World War and in Korea. He therefore committed the United States to the protection of South Vietnam. President Kennedy then greatly increased that commitment. President Johnson has again increased it, far beyond the level reached by President Kennedy.

"These increases of commitment have had a hardly noticed side effect, however. The effect has been to multiply the original American stake in Vietnam by an enormous factor—perhaps as much as tenfold.

"The original stake, summarized above, was certainly high enough. Nowadays, however, the effects of an American defeat in Vietnam will no longer be largely limited to Asia and the Pacific. With the stakes thus multiplied, the effects of an American defeat in Vietnam will now be felt, like earthquake tremors, in Moscow and in Bonn, in London and Buenos Aires, in Paris and Rio de Janeiro.

"The simplest way to put it is to say that if President Johnson submits to such a defeat, he will lose just about the entire authority which an American President normally enjoys overseas.

"In the circumstances, therefore, it is just as well that President Johnson does not seem to be prepared to accept the advice of those who are now urging him to accept defeat in Vietnam."

Death of Casey M. Jones

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. OLIN E. TEAGUE

OF TEXAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, August 11, 1965

Mr. TEAGUE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, it is my sad duty to announce the death of Casey M. Jones, who for a number of years was a professional aid to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.

Casey was first named to the committee staff in January of 1947, by the late chairman, the Honorable Edith Nourse Rogers. He served continuously with the committee until his retirement a number of years ago and made a real and lasting contribution to the accomplishments of the Committee on Veterans' Affairs during the period he was employed by the committee.

Casey had a distinguished record in World War I, in which he served as an intelligence officer, and had the distinction of serving with Teddy Roosevelt, Jr., and also with two former Members of Congress, the Honorable Jesse Walcott and Clarence Kilburn.

For a number of years Casey was associated with the Veterans of Foreign Wars, and was always keenly interested in the work relating to the needs and responsibilities of the veterans of this country.

A4468

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — APPENDIX

August 11, 1965

For a number of years he had been in poor health, and in recent months had found it necessary to be in the hospital almost continuously. He will be sorely missed by his many friends, and to his wife and other members of his family I extend my own sympathy and that of other members of the committee and the Congress who were privileged to know him.

ployed who are entitled to unemployment pay for a certain number of weeks.

Thus when you hear a radio voice drone through a routine to the effect that "we have openings for a certain number of managers, engineers, or other well paid jobs," this is the process through which the USES hopes ultimately to control the Nation's manpower.

Now the obvious danger is this: The time could come, unless this ambitious arm of the Federal Government is halted by Congress, when no citizen of this country, either employed or unemployed, could expect to get a job for which he was not recommended by this political agency. Already so-called aptitude tests are being given in some of these offices, with the results presumably recorded on agency cards. Corporate employers are being encouraged to employ only through the U.S. Employment Service, to decline to even grant interviews to individual seekers of jobs.

No wonder the Colorado director feels that within 5 years practically all hiring will be done through USES bureaucrats. Once more the freedom of the individual U.S. citizen is gradually being restricted. He finds the big union bosses on one side and the Federal bureaucrat on the other, both groups telling him what he must do and how. How much more like Russia can we get?

More Like Russia We Grow
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. JOHN J. DUNCAN
OF TENNESSEE
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, August 11, 1965

Mr. DUNCAN of Tennessee. Mr. Speaker, the Knoxville Journal often gives us some thought-provoking editorials, warnings which we should heed. In a recent issue the newspaper calls attention to the fast pace at which our Government is taking control of this Nation's manpower. I would like to call this to the attention of my colleagues and the public by publishing it in the Appendix of the RECORD:

[From the Knoxville, (Tenn.) Journal,
Aug. 3, 1965]

MORE LIKE RUSSIA WE GROW

In Russia or in any other totalitarian country there is no unemployment. They have rules that boil down to an ultimatum—he who won't work doesn't eat.

But that isn't the whole story, either. The citizen of any of the Communist countries not only must work to eat, but he must work at whatever the party bureaucrats assign him. The worker doesn't go to an employer, or even to his own government, to ask for a job he wants or thinks he could fill. Instead, he is listed on a roll of workers and sent to whatever job the party chieftain thinks he is fitted for, or wants him to do.

This couldn't happen to our workers here in this free country, you say. Well, now, couldn't it? Isn't this very thing on its way to happening to all this country's workers?

The director of the Colorado State Employment Service recently had this to say: "In 5 years, if we are not hampered by new restrictions, and if we get adequate funds from Congress, we'll (USES) be handling 90 percent of the employment business. We are not living in a free enterprise economy, but rather operating under a controlled economy."

Now in case the reader has been sleeping soundly while the U.S. Employment Service has been inking its plans to seize control of all American manpower, consider several developments. The 1,900 State unemployment offices were set up by Congress to serve those citizens out of work, primarily the ones who were unemployed, but eligible for unemployment compensation. They are State operated, but the money comes from the Federal Treasury.

Yet 1964 statistics reveal that 60 percent to 65 percent of the persons "placed" by the USES were already employed. They were not unemployed persons at all, but took advantage of the bureaucracy set up and operated out of Federal funds to improve their jobs. In recent months the USES has boasted that it has "placed" more than 250,000 professional or managerial personnel every year. These are jobs in brackets from \$10,000 to \$30,000 per year, not jobs to be filled from the ranks of the unem-

ployed who are entitled to unemployment pay for a certain number of weeks.

his views can be expected to carry great weight.

The 20-year-retirement feature, however, is only one of many aspects of the military system which the Cabinet group is exploring. The recommendations of the Committee, when they go to the President in December, are expected to answer such questions as:

Should military personnel be required to make contributions to a retirement fund, or should the present noncontributory system be continued?

Should retired pay continue to be based solely on active duty basic pay, without regard for other elements of military compensation such as subsistence and quarters allowances?

Should the rules for retirement be the same for enlisted personnel as they are for officers?

Is the present system of prescribing increases in retired pay (under the Consumer Price Index formula) fair, adequate, and soundly based?

Should efforts be made to insure that retired pay will keep pace not only with cost-of-living changes, but with living standards as well?

What benefits—such as medicare, commissioners' privileges, etc.—should be carried into retirement?

These are but a few of the questions the committee is exploring.

To find out how the military retirement system can be made more responsive to the needs of management as well as to the needs of individual retirees, the Cabinet Committee invited leaders of service-oriented organizations to appear at an open hearing and give their views.

Among those who testified were spokesmen for the Retired Officers Association, the Reserve Officers Association, Fleet Reserve Association, Air Force Association, Disabled Officers Association, and the Uniformed Services Retiree Group.

To a man, each of the witnesses urged one basic change in the present military retirement system. All said the Government should restore the concept of "recomputation." Under this once-traditional system, military retired pay would be computed as a percentage of current active duty pay for others in the same rank and with the same years of service.

Maj. Gen. W. Preston Corderman, president of the Retired Officers Association, cited the most compelling reason for reinstating the principle of recomputation. He recalled that older members of the military community served for long years at "comparatively small pay, in anticipation of a generous retirement system, only to see that system scrapped for 'cost of living' pay adjustments at about the time they entered upon retired status."

General Corderman said if the Government insists on its decision to shelve recomputation, the Consumer Price Index formula should be made applicable only to those who began wearing military uniforms after October 2, 1963, the date when recomputation was wiped off the books.

He reminded the Cabinet group that it is customary, when revising pay and retirement laws, "to insert a savings clause to prevent injustice to those who have already established rights under an existing statute."

Col. Arthur A. Brackett, speaking for the Reserve Officers Association, said that abandonment of the 100-year-old practice of recomputation "was a breach of faith" and the principle should be restored. He called the committee's attention to a June 12 Journal editorial on the subject and asked that it be made a part of the committee record. The editorial observed that service people have been the victims of broken promises in the retirement field and have suffered from attrition of many other benefits initially held out as attractions to career service.